A narrow window: How Europeans can still halt Georgia’s authoritarian turn

Georgia’s slide into authoritarianism is accelerating, triggering a major political and constitutional crisis. The ruling Georgian Dream party is consolidating power and escalating its repression of civil society and political opposition just as the European Union’s attention is elsewhere: on the flailing transatlantic alliance and on the Ukraine war.

In the face of an increasingly distant US and an aggressive Russia, Europe should work to assert its values and interests in the south Caucasus. Preventing Georgia’s full authoritarian turn and break with the West is crucial to this effort.

So far, however, the prevailing sentiment among some European officials is that they can do little to influence current developments.[1] This perception is partially rooted in the EU’s inability to reach a consensus on sanctions due to vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia. The EU’s unsuccessful high-level mediation of the 2021 political crisis also casts a long shadow.

The incoming German government, Britain and the “Weimar Triangle” have a narrow window of opportunity to halt repression and prevent Georgia’s further entanglement with Moscow

Yet Europeans’ fear of failure does not need to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Although the Georgian government is turning towards authoritarianism extremely fast, the incoming German government, along with Britain and a loose coalition between Germany, France and Poland (the “Weimar Triangle”), still have a narrow window of opportunity to halt repression and prevent Georgia’s further entanglement with Moscow.

Geopolitical Georgia

Russia and China are already benefiting from Georgia’s detour from its EU path. The Georgian government appears to be advancing Russia’s broader goal of pushing Georgia away from the West. The ruling Georgian Dream party froze the country’s EU accession, its rhetoric has been anti-Western, and it has created a parliamentary commission to investigate those Georgian Dream deems “responsible” for provoking the 2008 war with Russia. These actions are moving Tbilisi toward a quiet normalisation of relations with Moscow. Russia has also strengthened its hold over the occupied territories, particularly in Abkhazia, where it has expanded political and economic control and initiated the construction of a naval base at the Ochamchire port[2].

Georgia is also deepening ties with China. In 2017, the two countries signed a free trade agreement and a visa-free regime, and in 2023 they began a strategic partnership within which Tbilisi supported China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Civilisation Initiative and enhanced cooperation on “culture, science and education”. More recently, Georgia awarded the construction for the Anaklia Deep Sea Port Project to a Chinese-Singaporean consortium, bypassing Western bidders. China has eyed Anaklia since 2015 as a key BRI hub. With China emerging as a new actor in the region, Russia is doubling down on its own influence. The Ochamchire port in Abkhazia is just 30 kilometres from Anaklia.

As geopolitical competition intensifies in the Black Sea, the EU is developing its own strategy to advance its geoeconomic and diplomatic interests. This includes capitalising on the region’s potential for the EU’s trade and energy connectivity with the south Caucasus and Central Asia. The EU is investing €10bn in the Trans Caspian Transport Corridor to enhance transport connectivity with Central Asia and has expressed interest in supporting the Black Sea Submarine Cable, a project aimed at exporting renewable energy from the south Caucasus to the EU. It also held a summit in early April with central Asian countries to strengthen their relations. All these initiatives are promising, but successful cooperation hinges on having stable partners in the south Caucasus, to which Georgia is key. Ultimately, should any EU enlargement include Ukraine, Moldova and possibly Georgia, the Black Sea could become a predominantly European space in the face of Russian aggression.

Why Weimar

For now, however, the EU is totally blocked on Georgia, lacking the unity and willingness to negotiate with Tbilisi to halt its backsliding. The European Commission’s role in Georgia is currently limited to ensuring that frozen funds are redirected to civil society, while little space has been dedicated to direct political engagement.

As time is ticking, the Weimar triangle stands a greater chance than the wider EU. Poland and France have already taken a strong stance on issues in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood. Additionally, the incoming German government, led by chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz, has proved a bolder security actor than his predecessor, particularly on issues relating to Russian aggression.

This coalition is unified on Ukraine and Georgia, and remains committed to pooling resources for Europe’s strategic interests. Their combined political, economic, and diplomatic tools could send a strong signal of willingness to defend Georgia’s democratic and European path, while deterring further repression of protesters and political opponents. Berlin has taken notable steps, including freezing €237m in projects and issuing travel bans to select officials. Poland has imposed similar bans on eight individuals. Though France lacks a human rights–based sanctions regime, it can keep the issue on the EU agenda and leverage its diplomatic weight within and beyond the EU to ramp up pressure if needed.

The Weimar Triangle should also engage the UK, which brings added leverage. Britain recently sanctioned four senior Georgian officials for their roles in police violence and serious corruption, adding to the five sanctioned last December. And while US policy on Georgia remains unclear, the UK is currently better placed than the EU to coordinate with the Trump administration and sustain transatlantic alignment on the issue.

Talking with Tbilisi

Any European negotiation with Tbilisi should centre on core protester demands: releasing political prisoners, repealing repressive legislation, reversing the government’s capture of key institutions like the judiciary and electoral commission, and conducting snap parliamentary elections ahead of or alongside local elections. Reaching a mutually acceptable compromise between Georgian Dream and opposition parties will be challenging and may not yield immediate results. The European coalition should therefore consider a flexible approach, starting with the launch of a political dialogue aimed at de-escalating tensions. Initial steps should focus on halting repressions, suspending the work of the investigative commission, and releasing political prisoners. Gradually, this process can advance towards demanding the repeal of repressive legislation and holding elections once appropriate conditions are in place.

Such an initiative should include clear incentives and consequences. These could range from targeted sanctions relief to renewed support for the EU accession path (alongside Ukraine and Moldova) and continued cooperation with NATO. Georgia could also benefit from other EU initiatives, such as growth and investment plans designed to gradually integrate candidates into the EU, participation in selective EU policies and programmes, and cooperation between the EU and Georgia in peace, security and defence. For Georgia, there should be a clear benefit to agreeing to European assistance and deeper integration, especially as US engagement wanes.

But a successful European engagement hinges on the participation of Georgian Dream, and here, founder Bidzina Ivanishvili must see a personal incentive in such an initiative. The current ambiguity in US policy toward Georgia is likely unsettling for him.[3] His recent decision to repatriate assets from the West back to Georgia may also signal a growing vulnerability and fear of sanctions.

If Georgian Dream refuses to engage in a political dialogue and continues to implement its repressive agenda, the Weimar triangle, Britain and the EU should be ready to escalate pressure if needed. This includes personal sanctions targeting Ivanishvili and his circle, including business elites and officials responsible for orchestrating, financing and enforcing repressive measures. Should EU consensus on sanctions stall again, its member states should begin upgrading national legislation towards more flexible sanction mechanisms to enhance their leverage in Georgia and beyond.

Other tools include suspending visa liberalisation—a critical benefit for both urban and rural Georgians, particularly those dependent on seasonal EU work—making it a powerful lever. Suspending the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area would also impact small and mid-sized businesses, potentially increasing domestic pressure. Lastly, the Weimar Triangle, together with Britain, should advocate for halting financial support from institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD to intensify economic pressure on Georgian Dream.

In parallel, the EU should speed up the process of redirecting its financial assistance to civil society, prioritising independent media, media diversification and initiatives that foster dialogue between civil society, business and political actors. It should channel this support via a dedicated mechanism to protect recipients from exposure, drawing on lessons learned from civil society support efforts in Belarus and Russia.

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A renewed and high-level European engagement in Georgia would demonstrate that the EU is serious about defending its values and interests in the region—not ceding ground to authoritarian influence. If successful, it would bolster the EU’s broader ambitions in the Black Sea by strengthening its economic and security position in the region, as well as help dim Russian and Chinese influence efforts. For Georgians, it would be a powerful affirmation that Europe stands with their democratic aspirations and remains a committed force for defending democracy in its neighbourhood.

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[1] Based on author’s interviews with European officials, March-April 2025.

[2] The project is a strategic move to safeguard Russia’s naval forces after they suffered substantial losses from Ukraine’s 2024 strike on the Novorossiysk and Sevastopol ports.

[3] Based on author’s interviews with Georgian officials, Tbilisi, March 2025