A double bind: How unrest and geopolitics could end Serbia’s government

This winter has seen Serbian president Aleksandar Vucic skating on dangerously thin ice. Mass student-led anticorruption protests have led to the resignation of the prime minister, Milos Vucevic, as well as several other members of his government. Last week, the president hinted that the turmoil could lead to a snap parliamentary election come spring.

But public anger and Vucic’s collapsing government are far from his only problems. Even before the protests, the president’s longstanding “à la carte” approach to foreign policy of hedging Serbia between the West and Russia (with a side order of China) seemed to be in trouble. Both the European Union and Russia have been pressing Belgrade to choose a side. Now, Vucic has found himself with very little international sympathy for his domestic woes—and very little room for manoeuvre.  

This gives Europeans a key opportunity to help steer events towards stability and democratic progress while minimising the risk of regional spillover. To prevent prolonged instability and bring Serbia back on track, the EU should support civil society, address regional tensions, and reinforce Serbia’s European trajectory.

Some things aren’t new in Belgrade

The mass student-led protests began last November after the roof of the Novi Sad railway station collapsed, killing 15 people and severely injuring 2 others, with many Serbians holding government corruption responsible. Protestors grievances have since compounded, citing the mismanagement of public funds and poor governance, on top of existing dissatisfaction with a lack of media freedom, dysfunctional rule of law and a deliberate lack of electoral reform, not to mention Vucic’s ties to corruption and organised crime. Now, they are demanding a systematic change in how the country is governed and who governs it.

In many ways, this is nothing new. Serbians frequently protest against widespread corruption, election fraud, and the illiberal role of Vucic, with wide-scale anti-government demonstrations in 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2023. Until recently, however, Vucic has been able to keep a lid on political opposition by labelling them as foreign agents and using arrests, police force, and intimidation.

This time, however, the tide is turning. Vucic has repeatedly dismissed the protestors and their complaints (and has even leaped to the defence of a driver who rammed into a crowd of protestors and caused severe injuries). But he has not been able to quell Serbians’ anger. The current wave of protests have gathered traction among broad sections of society—they have the support of around two-thirds of the population and are the largest since 2000, when mass protests helped oust then-president Slobodan Milosevic.

Trouble inside and out

Such a clear display of domestic unpopularity for Vucic has affected his international partners’ willingness to stand behind him. On the one hand, Russia has publicly warned Serbia against descending into “chaos”. While Moscow is unlikely to support a leader halfway out the door, it will not give up on Serbia easily. Rather than support Vucic, it is likely Russia will attempt to mobilise the pro-Russia population in Serbia against him, or any other government that takes another step towards Europe. On the other hand, the EU has reaffirmed the need to protect citizens and protesters, but has largely stayed silent rather than rushing to Vucic’s aid in the name of stability as has been the case in the past.

Vucic has neither cultivated strong relations with the EU nor Russia, both of which questioned Serbia’s reliability as a partner long before the protests broke out

This risks compounding Vucic’s struggles to maintain his “à la carte” foreign policy. Throughout his tenure, he has positioned Serbia between the EU (for its economic and funding benefits) and Putin’s Russia (for undermining Kosovo’s independence, its gas and its fondness of illiberal rule), while snacking on other economies such as China’s. In the short-term, Belgrade’s ability to avoid full alignment with any specific bloc allowed it to play its own game and make economic gains. It has continued to build relationships by signing commercial agreements with countries like Egypt, Israel, and South Korea. But in the long term, Vucic has neither cultivated strong relations with the EU nor Russia, both of which questioned Serbia’s reliability as a partner long before the protests broke out.

For Brussels, Serbia’s dealings with Moscow have been a cause for concern. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Serbia has failed to join the EU in sanctioning Russia, and Vucic has recently offered himself as a connection for mediating between Ukraine and Russia, citing Serbia’s long friendship with Moscow. More recently, the president appointed two pro-Russian and US-sanctioned individuals as new members of his cabinet, even after the news on a Serbian agent for Russian influence within EU institutional bodies. In its latest report on accession, the EU lamented rule of law issues, a lack of media freedom and backsliding in democratic practices, as well as the still unfulfilled promise to recognise Kosovo. Member state hesitancy has prevented the next stage of negotiations opening, while Brussels has warned Serbia that siding with Russia on such issues runs counter to its EU accession and regional stability, but to little avail.

Moscow is also losing its patience. After the recent US sanctioning of Serbia-based energy company NIS of which Russia holds a 56% share, media close to Russia’s ministry of defence published an article directly condemning Vucic for his role in sanctioning NIS and for ending military cooperation with Russia in his attempts to show loyalty to the West. The article warns Vucic that he may be turning his back on Russia, but that the pro-Russian Serbian population will not walk the same path. Russia has also deviated from its typical stance against Kosovo’s independence to argue that if the EU recognised Kosovo, Moscow is justified to argue that the occupied Ukrainian region of Donbas should be recognised as Russian—much to the disappointment of Belgrade.

How Europeans can respond

All this means that a final erosion of Vucic’s power could be in sight. This would be hugely beneficial for Serbia’s European future in the long term. In the short term, however, Serbia’s political power has been so concentrated for so long that it would likely be chaotically reorganised. This could cause both domestic and regional instability. Within Serbia, tensions between citizens and the police could escalate, fuelling greater anger among the population. Criminal groups may also seize the opportunity to expand their operations, exacerbating internal instability and contributing to a rise in corruption.

Such turmoil would inflict collateral damage on neighbouring countries. For example, nationalist Serbs in Serbia may take advantage of the instability to stir up tensions in Kosovo, risking similar militia attacks to that of September 2023. Similarly, nationalist forces from Serbia and Republika Srpska could use the moment of chaos to push for the succession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

There are a few things the EU could do to support a smooth transition of power and mitigate these potential impacts. First, to avoid the spillover effects on regional stability, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo where the status quo is fragile, the EU and NATO should ensure ethnic and political tensions do not escalate and that stability is maintained.

Second, EU policymakers should engage in conversations with other members of the Serbian government, opposition and civil society and work in delegation formats to encourage accountability. The dialogues could be aimed at facilitating a smoother accession to the EU, restoring coherence within the Serbian political leadership and repairing the country’s democratic checks and balances. 

Lastly, the EU capitals and institutions should use this opportune moment to send a strong message that the future of Serbia is in Europe and send strong support to the students, whose demands are after all akin to those of European values. This will help mitigate Russia’s attempts to permeate unrest among the pro-Russian elements of the population. To show support for Serbia’s pro-democratic protestors, the EU should signal that without progress in rule of law, democratic practices and media freedom, its financial incentives will not be available.

While Serbians are adamant not to leave the streets until their demands are met, a political alternative does not seem to be in sight and the regime remains, at least for now. This is where European policymakers come into play: they should support the citizens trying to rewrite their country’s history with the very values that are at the EU’s core. This would finally demonstrate that the EU is much more than an institutional structure; it is the product of interconnected ideas that deeply resonate in the social and political life of European countries.