NATIONAL SECURITY

Strategy

and

Work programme 2007-2008
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NATIONAL SECURITY

Strategy
Foreword

SECURITY
IS EVERYONE'S CONCERN!

Security is the cornerstone of a society in which people feel free, at ease and connected. In our densely populated country, disasters can all too easily acquire a snowball effect, with all the ensuing societal consequences. Ironclad guarantees of perfect security can never be offered. But a great deal of suffering and damage can be prevented through thorough analysis of possible threats, well-defined prior agreements and a clear division of tasks.

Strengthening national security is a task for the national government. But a safe and secure living environment in the Netherlands requires everybody's involvement: from government in all its various forms and levels, but also from the private sector and civil society. Many threats can furthermore only be countered in cooperation with our international partners.

In order to be optimally prepared for various threats, the Cabinet has drawn up this national security strategy. It puts the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved in a coherent framework. Central to this strategy is a joined-up, whole-of-government approach to our national security. An approach that will ensure that everything necessary is done to safeguard the status of the Netherlands as a country in which people can live and work with their hearts and minds at ease. Security is everyone's concern. This strategy shows how, together, we can provide this goal with form and substance.

J.P. Balkenende
Prime Minister
SUMMARY

Threats to our security are changing and becoming ever more intertwined. Relatively minor threats can through increasing interdependencies lead to societal disruption. Answers to existing and new threats can therefore no longer be formulated and implemented by a single ministry or organisation. We need an integrated and coherent approach that can look beyond current threats. Planning and policy should no longer be primarily based on individual (known) threats, but on the extent to which overall national security is or can be threatened.

In order to realise this approach, the Cabinet has drawn up a national security(*) strategy. The aim of the strategy is to protect society and citizens within Dutch territory against internal and external threats. Our national security, however, cannot be viewed in isolation from the security of other countries, in particular those of our European partners and NATO allies. This also explains why internal security policy, which this strategy mainly deals with, and Dutch international security policy are so closely linked.

National security is jeopardized when vital interests of the Dutch state and/or society are threatened to such an extent that one can speak of – potential – societal disruption. The following vital interests have been defined: territorial security (threatened through breach of territorial integrity), economic security (undisrupted trade), ecological security (living environment), physical security (public health) and social and political stability (e.g. respect for core values such as freedom of expression).

Using the working method described in the strategy, the Cabinet will be better able to determine which threats endanger our national security and how to anticipate those threats, irrespective of their origin or nature. In addition, the method not only enables the Cabinet to make better substantiated choices in determining priorities and acting upon them, but also to view these choices in their relationship with each other.

While new, the working method makes use of existing, more sector-oriented processes; these come together in the working method, thus enriching information and insights and increasing knowledge. Use of the working method should obviously not lead to duplication of existing processes.

From 2009 onwards, the working method will be applied across the full range of national security issues. The period up to 2009 will be used to roll out the working method. The introduction in stages is described in the 2007-2008 work programme.

(*) In this document and in the working programme, the term ‘national security’ encompasses both security and safety. The term ‘national security’ is discussed in detail in chapter 2.
The working method will generate a strategic (long-term) foresight report every two years, the yearly selection of threat themes requiring in-depth analysis and a twice-a-year government-wide horizon scan of shorter-term threats. This scan will result in the report 'Threat Assessment Netherlands'. Moreover, once a year the results of the national risk assessment will be presented in the report 'Risk Assessment Netherlands'.

In order to make this possible, the working method starts by analysing the threats facing the Netherlands, assessing those threats in terms of risks to the vital interests and positioning these risks vis-à-vis each other: the national risk assessment. The Cabinet will then decide which risks will be prioritised for detailed treatment in the strategic planning stage. At that stage, the method will determine which capabilities the government would require to deal with the prioritised risks and which capabilities it already possesses and/or can expect from external parties, such as the business community, social organisations and international organisations. The Cabinet will then decide whether, and if so where and how, national security must be strengthened. The political/administrative choices will then be translated into policy, legislation and concrete measures.

The development of the choices made by the Cabinet is not only in the hands of the national government. Other public authorities, the business community and social organisations also play a role. In order to enable an integral approach, all parties involved must know and respect each other’s role in strengthening national security, follow a shared doctrine, align their working methods to each other and be connected to the same communication network. In 2007 the Cabinet will come up with concrete proposals for optimizing the aforementioned aspects of authority and control by the government in the area of national security.

Another essential component of the integral approach is the structural exchange of knowledge and information and alignment between the public and private parties – both in a national and an international context – who play a role in protecting national security.

As many threats to national security do not originate in our territory but can have consequences here, a purely national approach will not suffice. Countries are dependent on each other if they wish to increase their resilience. International cooperation, both at bilateral and multilateral level, is vital for reinforcing national security. The Cabinet is going to put security topics that require an international approach on the agenda. Wherever relevant, it will work in an international context to generate the capabilities deemed necessary to withstand threats. European programmes will also be leveraged to this aim. The goal of the Cabinet is to intensify the relationships with countries that use similar working methods to guarantee national security.
Introduction

WHY DO WE NEED THIS STRATEGY?

Our society is vulnerable. We see this when we are confronted with threats like bird flu, climate change and terrorism. The answer to existing and new threats cannot be formulated by one ministry or organisation alone. Reinforcement of national security requires a joined-up, integral approach within which international cooperation is an essential element. The strategy describes how the Cabinet is going to realise this approach.

National security is under threat when vital interests of our society and/or state are threatened in such way that it leads to (potential) societal disruption. The term ‘national security’ is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Reason for the strategy: more diffuse threats, greater consequences

SARS, bird flu, floods, terrorism; these are examples of threats which have demanded more and more attention in the last few years and which have made us realise our (increasing) vulnerability. Developments which threaten our country are changing and are increasingly becoming more closely entwined. Think of the connection between climate change and pandemics, or between ICT fallout and an interrupted energy supply. While many of these threats do not originate from the territory of the Netherlands, they can most certainly have consequences here. This limits our options for independently counteracting these threats: an exclusively national approach is often not sufficient. The rise in sea levels is an obvious example of this.

The report by Sir Nicholas Stern, Adviser to the UK Government, shows that climate change does not stand alone, but also has consequences for the health of humans and animals, the economy, migration flows and concomitantly the gap between rich and poor. A World Economic Forum report also concludes that threats are interrelated. This report emphasises the importance of an integral approach in order to be able to withstand threats.

1 Report ‘The Economics of Climate Change’, 30 October 2006 by Sir Nicholas Stern.
Moreover, the impact of disruptions is increasing. This is because over the past few decades Dutch society has become more complex and dependent on critical systems, such as ICT technologies. We see this as soon as something goes wrong. In addition, because of the greater population density, crises and disasters are more likely to result in a large number of casualties.

Naturally governments and private parties are already active in strengthening security. In order to be able to effectively direct these efforts, now more than ever cooperation is needed between all organisations that are responsible for national security: national government, local authorities, social organisations and the business community. An approach that guarantees integrality and coherence across security sectors is essential.

That is why the Cabinet has decided to establish a government-wide security strategy. Other countries, such as Germany, Finland, and Canada, have already developed such a strategy or are working on one. As international cooperation is necessary for reinforcing national security, it is important to have a national reference framework. This strategy primarily concerns the internal aspects of Dutch security policy.

### Strategies of other countries

**Germany:** ‘Neue Strategie zum Schutz der Bevölkerung in Deutschland’ (Bundesverwaltungsamt – Zentralstelle für Zivilschutz, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 2003).

**Finland:** ‘Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004’ (Prime Minister’s Office: Publications 18/2004).

**Canada:** ‘Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy’ (Privy Council Office, 2004).

### Goal: more coherence in the approach to national security

The Cabinet wants to reinforce national security by means of a coherent approach. The strategy describes the working method for realising this approach; a working method which, moreover, makes it possible to deal with (continually) changing risks. The integral working method enables the Cabinet to make better substantiated choices as to what risks are to be reduced and for what priorities the scarce (financial) resources have to be used. This strategy does not indicate the most important priorities, but describes the working method for defining these priorities. In addition, implementation of the working method can provide insight into new opportunities for reinforcing national security. These could include new technologies that can make the Netherlands safer.

The choices made by the Cabinet then form a guideline for actions by ministries, local government, the business community and social organisations. In this way a joined-up approach to national security emerges. Moreover, the choices which are made determine the Dutch contribution to international cooperation.
Much has already been put in motion (and realised) in the area of (national) security. Examples include: the intensification of civil-military cooperation (ICMS); the establishing of the National Terrorism Prevention Coordinator (NCTb); the public anti-terrorism campaigns (such as the ‘200,000 professionals’ campaign); protection of the critical infrastructure; the crisis management policy plan 2004-2007; the National Crisis Decision Making Manual; the revitalisation of the National Plan for the Prevention of Nuclear Accidents; the Security, Cooperation and Reconstruction Steering Group; the Reassessment of the ICT Security Policy project; the security regions Act; the individual responsibility publicity campaigns (such as the ‘Think Ahead’ campaign); the Interdepartmental Consultation on Energy Supply Assurance; the National Defence Doctrine; the Flood Management Taskforce (TMO) and the Government and Evacuations project.

The national security working method gives direction to these programmes and projects: results of the working method, e.g. analysed threats and prioritised risks, are the starting point for the various programmes and projects and planning cycles of, e.g., the security regions. Conversely, all of these programmes provide building blocks which can be used in components of the working method to reinforce national security. Regional risk inventories serve as input for the working method, for example. This interaction enables cross-sector cooperation, charts interdependencies and brings about information sharing. This results in an integral approach to national security.

![Figure 1: Relationship between national security, critical infrastructure and crisis management](image-url)

Reinforcement of national security focuses on the entire security chain – from pro-action and prevention, via preparation to response and after-care – and is strategic in nature. The national security working method gives direction to the protection of the critical infrastructure and crisis management. Moreover, these topics are geared to one or more links in the security chain: with critical infrastructure the emphasis is primarily on prevention (measures for better security of the critical sectors), while with crisis management, the emphasis is on preparation (preparation for incidents), response (if an incident has occurred) and after-care.
The strategy wants to offer the fullest possible protection against breaches of national security but cannot exclude the possibility of breach. After all, absolute security is an illusion, also in today’s world. The strategy makes the Netherlands more resilient in the event its national security were to be at risk. Moreover, the working method enables the government to communicate clearly on the possibilities and impossibilities of strengthening national security.

Work programme 2007-2008
Partly based on experience abroad, the Cabinet recognizes that development time is required to introduce the working method. The introduction in stages is described in the work programme 2007-2008. Commencing in 2009, the working method will be applied across the full range of national security issues. A work programme will then be drawn up periodically.

Structure of the strategy document
Chapter 2 defines the term ‘national security’. What is its scope? Chapter 3 first presents the working method for reinforcing national security in the form of a diagram; after that the components (from threat analysis to follow-up) are detailed. Chapter 4 discusses the role division in the execution of the working method. Finally, Chapter 5 reviews what the Netherlands can do in an international context.
Definition

2 WHAT DOES NATIONAL SECURITY MEAN?

The strategy is geared to preventing societal disruption. Vital interests, core values and various types of threats are distinguished.

National security is at stake when vital interests of our state and/or our society are threatened to such an extent that it might lead to societal disruption. National security encompasses both breach of security by intentional human actions (security) and breach due to disasters, system or process faults, human failure or natural anomalies such as extreme weather (safety).

This strategy is concerned with the protection of society and people within the nation’s own territory against internal and external threats. Naturally there are direct connections between national security and international security. In the Netherlands’ foreign policy, promoting national security is therefore of tremendous importance, even as other interests and objectives also play a role, such as striving for a just and fair world order and solidarity among allies.

National security as a concept in Dutch and European regulations

The concept ‘national security’ already exists in our regulations. For example it is used to define the working area of the information and security services. The scope of the concept is primarily determined in the WIV 2002 by the additional description of the activities of these services in the task articles themselves.

In the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the term national security forms one of the target criteria which justify an infringement of a number of fundamental rights. The term national security is not defined as such in the ECHR or in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. However, the jurisprudence does include a number of cases in which it is accepted that national security was at issue.

The interpretation of the term is broad: national security is delineated by what can be deemed necessary in a democratic society.

The term national security in the ECHR lies at the basis of the identical term in the bill of the National Security Administrative Measures Act. The term is not given a rigid delineation in the bill either; it must not be given too restrictive an interpretation. The latter point also applies to the term national security which is included in the Aliens Act 2000.

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4 Rules on imposing restrictive measures on persons with a view to the protection of national security and on the refusal or revocation of decisions with a view to the protection of national security (Parliamentary Documents II, 2005-2006, 30566, no. 2).
The goal of the strategy for national security is to protect the vital interests of the Netherlands in order to prevent societal disruption. These interests are also explicitly used in the risk assessment method that will be described in the following chapter.

The five vital interests are:

1. **Territorial security**
   The undisrupted functioning of the Netherlands as an independent state, and more specifically the territorial integrity of our country. The territorial integrity is at risk in the event, for example, of a threatened occupation of the state territory by another state, but also in the event of a terrorist attack.

2. **Economic security**
   The undisrupted functioning of the Netherlands as an effective and efficient economy. For example, economic security can be breached if trade with an important foreign partner is lost.

3. **Ecological security**
   Sufficient self-recovery capability of the living environment in the event of breach. Ecological security can be at risk due to, e.g., disruptions in the management of the surface water, but also due to climate changes.

4. **Physical security**
   The undisrupted functioning of humans in the Netherlands and its (living) environment. Physical security can be under pressure if, e.g., public health is threatened by an epidemic, but also if there is a major breach of the dikes or an accident in a chemical factory.

5. **Social and political stability**
   The undisrupted continued existence of a social climate in which groups of people live together without major conflict within the framework of the democratic state and shared core values. Social and political stability can be at risk if changes occur in the demographic structure of society (for example solidarity between generations), social cohesion and the degree of participation of the population in social processes.

The five interests are entwined; breach of one can lead to breach of other interests. For example, breach of the physical security (the fourth interest) can put pressure on the fifth interest: social and political stability. At the same time, this interest can also be directly threatened. By breach of social cohesion, for example. The degree of social cohesion is the result of the binding power of the core values of Dutch society. Breach of these values is the same as breach
of the core of Dutch society. In protecting vital interests, the context within which justice can be done to these values has to be safeguarded.

But protection of national security also affects these core values in a different way. For example, freedoms and rights (such as privacy) can be at risk due to policies aimed at reinforcing national security. In that sense there is a dilemma: the protection of vital interests for society demands policy, while that same policy can affect the core values for individuals and groups in that society. When applying the working method for national security a balance must be found in this respect too.

What are the core values of Dutch society?
The core values of our society are worded in the report ‘Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag’ (Values, standards and the burden of behaviour) of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)\(^6\). First of all, these are the values of the democratic state, such as:

- equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination
- freedom of religion and belief
- freedom of expression
- freedom of association, meeting and demonstration
- respect for privacy
- integrity of the person

A number of social values which are necessary for a properly functioning democratic state also fall under the core values. Think of, inter alia, truthfulness, empathy and sympathy for others, respect for the opinion of others and willingness to modify one’s own opinion, but think also of social skills such as flexibility, responsiveness and sense of responsibility, a certain pragmatism and being able to bear uncertainty and ambivalences.

Protection against threats
At present, nine threats have been identified which can lead to societal disruption (see the box below). But what is a threat at present may well have been neutralised in a few years. And what is latent now can be transformed into an acute danger in the near future. Moreover, account must be taken of threats which are not (yet) currently foreseen. It is therefore necessary to have a working method which offers a counterbalance to ‘the craze of the day’.

The working method therefore looks beyond threats: planning and policy are no longer based on specific (known) threats, but the degree in which national security is or can be threatened is taken as the point of departure. ‘Looking beyond threats’ presumes an approach whereby the borders between sub-areas of national security (which have been demarcated between ministries, local governments and other organisations) become blurred, thus preventing that topics are dealt with twice over or, worse still, end up not being discussed at all.

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\(^6\) See the WRR report ‘Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag’, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2003.

\(^7\) In 2005 there was an interdepartmental inventory of proactive government policy to prevent societal disruption. Nine threats were identified which can lead to societal disruption. Each threat was then sub-divided into a number of incident categories.
The breach referred to here can also be the result of civil wars and regional wars. Radicalisation in its most extreme form can lead to terrorism, but also threatens social cohesion in Dutch society without an act of terrorism being required. This explains why radicalisation has been classified under two categories.

### Threats and incident categories

This overview is subject to change: the application of the working method which is described in Chapter 3 can lead to new insights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Incident categories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>'Classic' threats</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Breaches of international peace and security</td>
<td>- failing states</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- risk countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear)</td>
<td>- distribution of CBRN weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Terrorism</td>
<td>- catastrophic terrorism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- radicalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. International organised crime</td>
<td>- increasing connection between the legitimate and the criminal world</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- worldwide trade in drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social-economic threats</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social vulnerability</td>
<td>- increasing (inter-ethnic) tensions and decreasing sense of citizenship</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- radicalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Digital lack of security</td>
<td>- digital paralysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Economic lack of security</td>
<td>- extreme scarcity of energy carriers and raw materials</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Natural threats</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Climate change and natural disasters</td>
<td>- increasing risk of flooding</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- increasing risk of extreme drought/heat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- plague organisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Outbreak of infectious diseases and animal diseases</td>
<td>- pandemics of known human diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- viruses which can be transmitted from animals to humans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 The breach referred to here can also be the result of civil wars and regional wars.

9 Radicalisation in its most extreme form can lead to terrorism, but also threatens social cohesion in Dutch society without an act of terrorism being required. This explains why radicalisation has been classified under two categories.
National security working method

3 HOW TO ACHIEVE REINFORCEMENT?

The working method for reinforcing national security consists of three stages: (1) a government-wide analysis of threats and assessments of risks (what is coming the Netherlands’ way?), (2) strategic planning (does the Netherlands have the requisite capabilities?) and (3) follow-up (how and where will national security be reinforced?). This working method enables the Cabinet to make well-founded political and administrative choices and to set priorities for policy-making. Finally, a government-wide application results in a common language for national security.

3.1 The working method set out in a diagram

The working method for reinforcing national security (see Figure 2) is a continual process. The working method consists of:

- **Stage 1: analysis of threats and assessment of risks**
  In order to protect the vital interests as best as possible, it is important to continually possess a clear picture of potential threats. The working method therefore starts with an analysis of the threats facing the Netherlands, an assessment of the threats in terms of risks to vital interests and a weighing of these risks vis-à-vis each other. At the end of this stage, The Cabinet will decide which risks are prioritised for detailed follow-up in the strategic planning stage.

- **Stage 2: strategic planning**
  In this stage the government determines which capabilities it would require to deal with the prioritised risks and which capabilities it already possesses and/or can expect from external parties such as the business community, social organisations and international organisations. The Cabinet will then be given advice on, inter alia, the following questions: where is the government going to deploy resources (and where is it not) and in what stage of the security chain? The acceptability of choices is also considered.

- **Stage 3: follow-up**
  Here, the political-administrative choices are developed into, e.g., policy, legislation and concrete measures.
1. Government-wide analysis

Process

- Strategic foresight
- Short-term horizon scanning
- National risk assessment
- Thematic in-depth study

Result

- Report on strategic foresight
- Report on themes and scenarios
- Report on threat assessment
- Report on risk assessment

Decision making

- Cabinet: Sets topics for thematic in-depth study (December)
- Cabinet: Sets priorities on the basis of the report on risk perception (December)

NB: the Cabinet will be informed and asked to make decisions twice a year (June and December).
Cabinet
Decides on reinforcing national security via regular budget process (June)
Per (component of a) stage, the government will weigh which (parts of) reports are to be made public. The guiding principle is the greatest possible degree of openness.10

Twice a year, the Cabinet will be informed or asked to make decisions.

The three stages are explained in the paragraphs below.

### 3.2 Stage 1: Government-wide analysis of threats and assessment of risks

In the first stage of the working method, a distinction is made between analysis and assessment. During the analysis, known and new threats will be identified and detailed. An integral analysis of threats will, moreover, improve sensitivity to early and weak signals. The chance or probability factor is then added in the risk assessment: risk = chance x effect.

The analysis is based on three time-horizons: long term (from approx. 5 years), mid term (up to approx. 5 years) and short term (up to approx. 6 months). This changes the perspective of the analyses from exploratory (long term), to policy-based (mid term) and action-oriented (short term).

In the analysis and risk assessment, use is made of existing, more sector-oriented procedures; these are merged to enable an integral approach. Knowledge is shared, both by domestic and foreign government organisations, the business community and the academic world. This results in a broadening and deepening of this knowledge. It also allows the Netherlands to learn from the experience of others, and to more effectively share knowledge and information (internationally).

It is important for the Cabinet that the analysis and assessment process is objectively reviewed in order to guarantee its quality. The Cabinet is considering engaging (international) persons and institutes who will not execute the analyses and assessments themselves, but who do have expertise which is comparable to that of the parties which do carry out the analyses and assessments (peer review).

#### Strategic foresight (long term)

The goal of strategic foresight is to determine which (new) threats require further investigation with regard to their consequences for national security. Account is taken in this respect of such things as, e.g., geopolitical developments.

The foresights first of all provide insight into new threats that can influence national security in five years or more. In addition, they signal possible trends in known threats. Use is made in this respect of knowledge that is available at

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10 The limits of the openness are determined by, inter alia, analogy with Article 10 of the Open Government Act.
national and international level regarding possible future situations and the threats ensuing from these for national security. Sources include publications of planning offices and advisory bodies, and studies by, e.g., universities, the business community and international organisations. Cross-analyses are made of these various sources.

Every two years, the Cabinet receives the result of this effort in the form of a report, ‘Strategic Foresight on National Security’. On the basis thereof the Cabinet will determine for what (new) threats further research is required. The outcome determines the agenda for the thematic analyses and risk assessment in the mid term. Certain developments can in the long term form such a serious threat to national security that policy measures must be considered. Think of the consequences of climate change. Within the strategic planning it will then be researched what policy measures are required.

**Thematic in-depth study (mid-term)**

This component of the working method leads to the most complete possible picture of known and new threats that can have consequences for national security within a term of up to 5 years.

A thematic approach makes it possible to establish links between different perspectives. This enables the topic of climate change to be approached from the perspective of extreme weather (floods, drought) but also from the perspective of infectious diseases and animal diseases (pandemics, zoonoses). The thematic in-depth study also results in extra knowledge on existing and new threats.

The results of the thematic in-depth study can differ in form: they can be scenarios for the mid term (for example: how will social tensions manifest themselves in Dutch society?) but can also be identified trends.

**Horizon scanning (short-term)**

This component leads to reinforcement of the signalling function for concrete threats to national security in the short term (within about six months). Signals of possible threats are shared in a timely fashion (e.g. by using (existing) alarm systems) throughout the government, so that the responsible parties can take cohesive measures, taking each party’s individual responsibility into account. In this manner short-term horizon scanning contributes to the reinforcement of the collective approach to possible threats. Moreover, events today can give rise to strategic discussions about the organisation of the Netherlands in the long term.

Short-term horizon scanning will, twice a year, result in a report titled ‘Threat Assessment in the Netherlands’.

11 Such as the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Social Cultural Planning Bureau, the Environmental and Nature Planning Bureau, the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, the Scientific Council for Government Policy, the Council for Urban Planning, the Environment and Nature Research and the Council for Social Development.
**National risk assessment**

Analysed threats are then measured on one yardstick in accordance with a pre-agreed model. The risk assessment has an all hazards approach. Scenarios for, e.g., floods, pandemics and long-term fallout of utilities and for incidents of an intentional nature are described in a clear manner, substantiated with figures and weighted. In this manner the risks for national security become comparable.

Assessment is carried out a) of the likelihood that a scenario will occur and b) what its impact will be, particularly on the vital interests as described in Chapter 2. The impact can be divided into an objective component (e.g. disruption of essential supplies, material damage, number of victims) and a subjective component (the psychological effect on the population, and, e.g., the public outrage aroused by an - imminent – event). The perception factor is thus explicitly considered in the risk assessment.

Annually the results of the national risk assessments are published in a report, ‘Risk Assessment in the Netherlands’. The risk prioritisation determines which risks are going to form part of the strategic planning (see Stage 2).

**Stage 2: strategic planning**

The decisions of the Cabinet following the risk assessment form the starting point for the strategic planning process. The goal of this stage of the working method is to provide insight on the extent to which the Netherlands can withstand the prioritised risks. Strategic planning considers the entire security chain in this respect.

**The capabilities-based approach**

The strategic planning relies on a capabilities-based approach, also known as capabilities based planning (CBP). This approach is not geared towards one specific threat or risk. Rather it focuses on what is necessary to prevent the consequences of threats or risks as much as possible (prevention) and/or to be prepared (preparation and response). It is a flexible approach: tasks and capabilities can be used in this approach to withstand various threats.

**Background of the capabilities-based approach**

The capabilities-based approach derives its rationale from the increased diversity in the threat picture. The changing and more diffuse threat picture was cause for the Ministry of Defence to no longer work with specific threats, but to base defence planning on the CBP method. Countries like Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia apply this method in the realisation of their strategic security policy; internationally the capabilities-based approach is seen as a tried-and-tested method to anticipate diverse threats government-wide, across sectors and flexibly.
The capabilities-based approach entails that the government takes the prioritized risks emerging from the national risk assessment and:

- determines, with the help of planning assumptions, which tasks it has to be able to perform to deal with that risk;
- reviews what capabilities it requires to be able to execute those tasks (the desired situation);
- establishes which capabilities it already has (the current situation);
- compares both situations and identifies gaps or redundancies (doing the same thing twice).

**Examples of tasks and capabilities of the national government**

The capability approach does not assume a one-on-one relationship between threats, tasks and capacities. The execution of one task may be necessary for various threats. A 'large-scale evacuation' for example, will have to be executed in the event of both a nuclear accident and a flood. In the same manner a capacity can be used for tasks ensuing from various types of threats. Think of the emergency drinking water supply capability which can be used in a breach of the quality of drinking water as a result of an ecological threat, but also as a result of a terrorist attack. Another example of a capability is having a model allowing for upscaling; with regard to crisis decision making, this is recorded in the National Crisis Decision Making Manual.

When executing the strategic planning stage the focus is on the presence of capacities at both the national and the decentralised level. The current structure of (preparation for) crisis management at local and regional level is taken as the starting point in this respect. Third party resources can form part of the ‘national potential’ to respond to a specific threat.

**What does the strategic planning stage give us?**

The results of the strategic planning stage will allow the Cabinet to decide whether a reinforcement of capabilities is required in view of the prioritised risks, and if so, in what areas and at what stage of the security chain. This reinforcement can be the responsibility of a specific department or of parties outside of the (national) government, but also of the country as a whole (e.g. a national reserve of resources to combat a pandemic). Strategic planning also allows for the identifications of crosslinks, not only within the government but also between the government and the parties outside of the government; this enables available resources to be used effectively.

The Cabinet makes choices about how national security is reinforced: by developing or intensifying policy, adjusting the statutory instruments or by taking concrete measures. The need for reinforcing national security is always weighed up against the consequences thereof for other interests, e.g. the rights of individuals. In addition, the proposed measures and policy intensifications must be in proportion to the goal, both with regard to effectiveness and efficiency. In other words, the proportionality of the measures to reinforce national security is explicitly included in the consideration.
Strategic planning provides insight into how the tasks could be optimally divided between national government, other authorities, social organisations and the private sector. In some sectors, private institutions are responsible for safeguarding continuity and offering an adequate response to all sorts of possible threats. One example of this is the telecommunications sector. Strategic planning is an instrument for clarifying and optimising the combined action between these parties; it systematically brings people, resources, plans and procedures together and clearly sets out what people can expect from each other. In addition, this creates a common frame of reference.

3.4 Stage 3: follow-up

Decisions made in the Cabinet on the basis of the strategic planning stage are used by the public and private institutions which have to work out these decisions. They do this within existing plans and policy cycles geared to reinforcing national security, such as protecting the critical infrastructure and the crisis management policy plan. Moreover, the realisation is linked to the regular budget cycle. The chapter below discusses the roles played by various players in the reinforcement of national security.

Ambition

As of 2009 the working method must be fully operational. This implies that:

- (long term) strategic foresight is carried out every two years from the perspective of national security;
- annually topics are chosen which require in-depth analysis from a mid-term perspective. These topics are in part determined by the results of the strategic foresight;
- annually there is national risk assessment in which all relevant risks for national security are assessed using the same model;
- the results of this risk assessment are used for strategic planning of tasks and capabilities;
- twice a year a government-wide short-term horizon scanning is executed, whereby possible short-term threats are exchanged between the parties involved and in which any measures for an adequate collective approach are aligned to each other;
- strategic planning is systematically used in the course of 2008 to answer the question whether the government is adequately prepared for a diversity of threats. Toward this end, the capabilities-based approached will be worked out in further detail as a planning methodology in 2007-2008;
- the Cabinet makes substantiated political and administrative choices to reinforce national security on the basis of the outcomes of the strategic planning stage.
Role division

4 HOW TO REALISE THE STRATEGY?

The direction for reinforcing national security is in the hands of the national government. But other public and private parties also contribute. In order to be able to act effectively before, during and after a crisis, agreements are necessary regarding authority and control. For example, think of a quick exchange of information via the same communication network.

4.1 Role of the national government

Security is everyone’s concern. The national government, local governments, the business community, social organisations and citizens all make a contribution toward reinforcing national security. The national government directs these activities to safeguard national security.

Within the national government, the guiding principles of role division are as follows:

• the national security programme is an interdepartmental responsibility whereby existing responsibilities are not affected, e.g., with regard to foreign policy;12
• a programme manager is responsible for implementing and assessing the national security strategy. The programme manager also monitors the coherence of execution. Overall coordination is in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations;
• the programme manager is supported by a highly interdepartmental secretariat. The programme secretariat encourages the involvement of national and international parties (public and private), coordinates the political decision-making process and facilitates the government-wide working method to reinforce national security;
• for every substantive topic it will be stipulated what department has primary responsibility;
• placement on the Cabinet agenda goes via an interdepartmental and ministerial portal in which all policy areas are represented that are necessary to do justice to the all-hazard approach.

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12 This relationship is mentioned explicitly as national security also has direct areas of interface with foreign policy, which of course remains the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4.2 Authority and control

National security cannot optimally be provided without clear agreements on authority and control. The authority prior to and after the end of a crisis has other characteristics in this respect than control during a crisis.

Authority prior to and after the end of a crisis

The preventative efforts in the framework of national security are aimed at preventing societal disruption or the recovery of the consequences thereof. The emphasis lies on solving major policy issues. Very many actors play a role in this respect. Think of often diffuse conglomerates of interested parties, such as citizens (whether or not organised in action groups), business community and administrators. In addition, there is a complex field of responsible authorities and institutions. In order to weigh up interests and find a solution with all actors, the goal is consensus, after which the responsible parties will make a decision. Authority in this stage is primarily geared to the development of policy. There must be consensus on the areas of national security concern that are taken into consideration. Also think of setting conditions that the policy development for national security must satisfy.

Crisis control

If a breach of national security occurs or is at risk of occurring the situation changes. In this stage there is a lack of time; immediate action must be taken, without delay. Moreover, there are usually insufficient people and resources to manage the situation. That is why priorities have to be set. A consideration is also made in this respect regarding the use of force. Quick information exchange, validation and analysis of information and the management of large quantities of information are crucial to adequately controlling the situation. In case of a crisis, it is vital that messages do not conflict with each other. Toward this end it is necessary that communication between regional and national government and between the relevant sector and the relevant ministry takes place within a closed system.

The procedure in case of response is of a completely different nature than those in the other stages. After all, a consensus model is impossible during a crisis. An unequivocal control concept will have to be developed for the coordination of information provision and other activities.

One procedure for authority and control at all stages

Despite the different characteristics, all stages of the security chain have one procedure for authority and control. This procedure consists of four steps:
- gathering and analysis of information;
- processing information into proposals for decision making;
- making decisions;
- implementing decisions and supervising the execution.
Applying one procedure both prior to and during a crisis is of great importance. In order to respond adequately during a crisis it is essential that people who are involved in crisis management make use of the same work routines as in the preceding stages.

Four principles of authority and control

In order to effectively go through the procedure of authority and control it is necessary for all parties involved to have a single primary objective. This means that they make a common and synchronised joint effort to reinforce national security. In order to make this possible, it is desirable that all persons involved support and apply the four principles described below.

1. Clear role division and role consistency

A clear role division of labour exists between the relevant parties and they also stick to their roles. In other words: the parties are well aware of each other’s responsibilities and powers, and respect those, regardless of the stage of the security chain. The control of the process will, by necessity, have a more mandatory character in the response stage.

2. Unité de doctrine

All parties involved apply a common doctrine for all types of threats. This doctrine contains a shared conceptual framework and regulates the information exchange and the modular deployment of generic capabilities which – depending on the nature of the threat – are necessary (for example fire fighting, decontamination, crowd & riot control and evacuation).

3. Working methods aligned to each other

All public and private parties involved have aligned their working methods with each other. A number of points are of special importance in this respect:

- the decision-making procedures must be aligned with each other. This is not only necessary to be able to quickly go through the decision-making procedures with this many parties, but also to be able to apply technical concepts for information exchange, such as network-enabled capabilities;
- ensuring a common communication strategy for all parties involved;
- synchronisation of planning: local, regional and national plans must be aligned to each other. Plans of the private sector must also align to this;
- on behalf of (multidisciplinary) operational deployment during a crisis, there must be professional unity of command. This is partly necessary to enable the modular deployment of generic capabilities;
- adequate multidisciplinary action is promoted by regular joint exercises and joint training where possible.
4. Uniform information network

All parties involved must be connected to the same communications network. This is both necessary for adequate information exchange and for the application of concepts such as the aforementioned network enabled capabilities.

4.3 Role division with other parties

An integral approach to national security requires a clear picture of international, regional and (semi-) private roles and tasks. In addition, it is important to realise that all parties need each other as a result of the increasing complexity of threats and interdependencies between sectors. Analyses relating to critical infrastructure have made it clear that sectors are dependent on each other: for example, ICT fallout or disruption of the power supply can affect many sectors.

The results of the capabilities approach enable to explore the boundaries of the role of (security) regions and (semi-)private institutions: what do they do themselves, where should the national government facilitate and what are they responsible for?

In some sectors, e.g. telecommunication, the business community has primary responsibility for safeguarding continuity and responding to all sorts of threats. Involvement by the national government starts from a predetermined degree of disruption, whereby the relationship with national security is examined, including possible effects on other critical sectors.

Companies often operate in an international context, e.g. as a multinational or in an international industry association. But ministries are also internationally active. And (security) regions at national borders often have contacts with the neighbouring regions just across the border. Alignment, cooperation and knowledge exchange between these parties is a prerequisite for effective reinforcement of national security. Also here the four principles for authority and control play an important role.

It must be continually questioned which scale is the most effective for the intended reinforcement of national security: can the proposed approach be found within the Netherlands or is international cooperation also, or specifically, necessary - with neighbouring or nearby countries (e.g. bilateral or trilateral alliances), at regional level (EU, OSCE), at transatlantic level (NATO), global level (UN) or at several levels at the same time. It is conceivable that an aligned approach at several levels simultaneously may be the most desirable option: an ‘both-and’ approach.

Scale is also relevant within the Netherlands; for example, the security regions better enable the municipalities to prepare for (new) threats. In addition,
the security regions increase the administrative and operational effectiveness of parties involved in regional contingency plans and crisis management: the organisation of the fire brigade, medical assistance in the event of accidents and disasters, contingency plans and crisis management are placed under one effective regional administrative management. Unity, uniformity and simplicity are thus achieved in this approach.

**Ambition**

The national government cannot reinforce national security on its own; alignment and cooperation with other parties in the public sector and between the public and private sector are of great importance. The Cabinet has the following goals:

- all parties involved – public authorities, business community and social organisations – subscribe to and apply the principles of authority and control: knowing and respecting each other’s role in reinforcing national security, applying a common doctrine, aligning working methods with each other and being connected with each other via the same communication network;
- structural exchange of knowledge and information:
  - with umbrella organisations from the business community, such as the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (known as VNO-NCW). Toward this end, the Cabinet places security themes on the agenda which also require action by the private sector. This form of alignment fits in with existing contacts between ministerial departments and parts of the business community;
  - within the public sector: horizontal (within the national government) and vertical (particularly with the security regions).

In 2007 the Cabinet will make concrete proposals to optimise the authority and control by the government in the area of national security.
WHAT CAN THE NETHERLANDS DO IN A WIDER CONTEXT?

National security requires international cooperation. As a member state of, inter alia, the EU, NATO and the UN, the Netherlands aligns with and agrees with the security strategies of international organisations. Our country utilises the possibilities provided by bilateral, regional and global forms of cooperation.

The Netherlands in the global community
National security cannot be safeguarded by national measures alone. Continuing globalisation entails that developments occurring far beyond our national borders can directly or indirectly affect our security. Moreover, there are issues which can only be dealt with in an international context; just think of climate change. The administrative levels at national, regional and global echelon are interdependent. This interdependency requires intensive international cooperation and alignment.

International cooperation is indispensable
International cooperation enables the Netherlands to influence developments over which it has no control without such cooperation. This is possible by means of bilateral (e.g. in the case of flood risk) or multilateral (e.g. in the case of ICT security) agreements. The Netherlands can also provide substantive inputs into the (national and international) security-relevant policy of international organisations. The Netherlands underscores the importance of international cooperation and will optimally utilise all possibilities it offers. It will take an active stance in international organisations and forums.

Alignment with strategies of international organisations
As a member state of, inter alia, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Netherlands is aligned with and agrees with the security strategies of these organisations. Said strategies particularly describe the possibilities of international cooperation and the role that international organisations play therein, and leave scope for the member states in the realisation of their own national policy to reinforce security.
Ambition

Reinforcing national security requires that the Netherlands is continually aware that it is not an individual player in this area and that threats cross borders. The national approach must be aligned to that of other states and organisations.

The Cabinet:

- places security topics that require an international approach on the agenda. The results of the national risk assessment and the strategic planning will be used toward this end;
- assesses to what extent the capabilities requirement can be met internationally and how this can be organised. As much alignment as possible is sought with existing international initiatives.

For example, in the response stage there are coordination mechanisms within both the EU and NATO that enable the provision of international assistance in the event of a disaster or crisis, thereby supplementing nationally lacking or limited capabilities;13

- supports and utilises European programmes such as the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and the European Security Research Programme (ESRP). This can prevent duplication in approach and lead to financial savings;
- supports initiatives which strive to reinforce international cooperation and alignment;
- structurally exchanges international knowledge and information and shares best practices in the area of national security. The goal is an intensification of the relations with those countries that apply comparable working methods for guaranteeing national security;
- endeavours to realise solutions with individual countries which are deemed necessary to reinforce national security. Solutions are being sought which simultaneously help to answer international security issues. In this manner the Netherlands contributes to the reinforcement of international cooperation.

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13 EU: Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC); NATO: Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).
NATIONAL SECURITY

Work programme
2007-2008
1 GOAL AND STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY WORK PROGRAMME 2007-2008

1.1 Goal of the work programme

The national security work programme 2007-2008 will guide the implementation of the working method as presented in the national security strategy. This implementation requires an incremental approach. The working method should be fully developed by the end of this work programme (December 2008) and subsequently be applied to all national security issues. In parallel with this development, the working method will already be tested in the current environment.

Strengthening of national security requires an integral approach covering all potential threats (all hazard), including the correlations between the various threats. This entails an essential value added of the working method and signifies the importance of a broad involvement of parties at national government level as well as at regional and local levels, of international organisations, and of stakeholders within the private sector, academia and knowledge institutions.

In addition to broad stakeholder involvement, thorough analysis of the national security environment also requires high quality input. Exchange of information is a prerequisite for further enhancement/enrichment of knowledge of that environment. This means that all potential sources and capabilities will have to be exploited to achieve high-quality analysis results and planning advice, including those available at think tanks, the business community, and government, nationally as well as internationally. The simultaneous and interacting development of the working method on the one hand and the application thereof to specific themes on the other will determine the quality of products to be delivered.

This dual objective of broad-based and high quality involvement emphasizes the importance of the mobilisation of the (inter)national network relating to national security. The work programme envisions the establishment of a durable network at the end of 2008. The national security network serves to establish relationships between existing activities of various national and international partners and the activities of partners that are not yet included in the network.
1.2 Structure of the work programme

The work programme consists of three parts.

1 The development and application of the national security working method (Chapters 2 and 3). The working method is applied to three specific themes:
   • climate change;
   • polarisation and radicalisation;
   • energy supply assurance.

Furthermore, the method of strategic planning will be tested for the task of mass evacuation to assess whether current capabilities are adequate to execute this task or whether strengthening of capabilities is required.

2 The establishment of the (inter)national security network (Chapter 4).

3 The implementation of a number of programme activities (Chapter 5).
2 CHOICE OF THEMES

2.1 Rationale

The aforementioned themes have been placed on the agenda for the following reasons:

• providing relevance: these themes are currently high-profile and will continue to require attention in the mid to long term. Ongoing activities on these themes can be exploited thus preventing redundancy of work and reinforcing the outcomes of the analysis;

• demonstrating the integral nature: these themes are multi-faceted, reinforcing/demonstrating the potential value added of government-wide strategic analysis and planning;

• supported by relevant parties: these parties see an added value in choosing these themes.

2.2 Theme definition and description

At the conclusion of the current work programme the following will have been accomplished for each of the three themes:

• a government-wide analysis of these themes, yielding as comprehensive a picture of the problem as possible: state of affairs, expectations, integral effect analysis at different time-horizons plus a risk assessment to assess the relative seriousness of the problems.

• recommendations for the government-wide strategic planning as guidance for political-administrative decisions on (additional) requisite capabilities.

Theme: Climate change

2006 saw the publication of many studies which concluded that climate change is a fact. For example, the KNMI (Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute) published new climate scenarios in May. In summary, expectations up to the year 2050 are for warmer summers and wetter winters. The warm autumn of 2006 is a good example of this, as never before had an average temperature increase of more than 1 degree Celsius been observed. In Al Gore’s movie (‘An Inconvenient Truth’) and the recent study by the British scientist Stern (‘Stern Review: the Economics of Climate Change’, 2006) it is, moreover, clearly outlined that while climate change in itself is not a threat, it does trigger very diverse effects. These range from new developments in human and animal diseases (a shift in the breeding grounds of the malaria mosquito and the tiger mosquito, the emergence of bluetongue), changes in the distribution of wealth in the world (economic consequences of climate change) to altered migration flows in the world.

1 See also the report ‘Global Risks 2007’, World Economic Forum, January 2007. This report identifies oil price shock/energy supply interruptions, international terrorism, climate change and pandemics as the most important risks.
The analysis will align with and build upon existing research and ongoing projects such as the climate scenarios of the KNMI, effects of climate change in the Netherlands of the Environmental and Nature Planning Bureau (MNP), the Spatial and Climate Adaptation Programme (ARK), the Organisational Preparation for Flooding Improvement Programme, the Taskforce for Flood Management (TMO), Water Safety in the 21st Century (WV21), Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport Study on Climate and Health, the Dutch follow-on study to the flu pandemic scenario of the World Health Organization (WHO). For the short-term analysis the emphasis will be put on extreme weather (and the related threat of floods, excessive heat/drought) and health (humans, animals). For the mid term, a literature-based analysis will be carried out as to whether all possible consequences of climate change have been charted. This includes the impact of long-term developments in the mid term. On the basis of these analyses a decision will be made whether specific topics require more in-depth study. Incident scenarios relating to climate change will be developed to be used for the national risk assessment. At this stage, currently existing large-scale flood scenarios will be used: the high tide and floods scenarios from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, scenarios for infectious diseases from the Ministry of Health, Welfare Sport and scenarios for animal diseases from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality.

Theme: Polarisation/radicalisation in society

Polarisation and radicalisation processes among, in particular, Muslims and extreme-right youths appear to be increasing in scale, speed and intensity. The AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) writes in this respect: “The greatest current threat to the Dutch democratic legal order is the existence of a broad social problem where in an atmosphere of frustration about the Dutch ‘multicultural’ society, inter-ethnic confrontations are being provoked by both sides of the ethnic divide. Ongoing inter-ethnic confrontations can over time threaten the cohesion in Dutch society”. Trends of polarisation are, in other words, at the very least just as great a threat to our country as the possibility of a terrorist attack. The Institute for Security and Crisis Management (COT) describes polarisation as “the sharpening of contrasts between groups in society that result or can result in (an increase in) tensions between these groups and in risks for societal security and security perception”. Examples include increasing distance between groups, segregation, negative image building and negative attitudes on both sides. Expressions that may reflect polarisation are bullying, discrimination, vandalism, intimidation, racism and violence.

Occurrences of polarisation are closely related, but not identical to trends of radicalisation. Radicalism adds a separate ideological and goal-oriented dimension. The AIVD describes radicalisation as “the (active) striving for and/or supporting of far-reaching changes in society, which can constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (goal),

possibly with the application of undemocratic methods (means), which can negatively affect the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)\(^4\). “Radicalism ensues from a mentality characterised by thoughts and actions which are governed by an overriding ideal, belief, goal or interest. Radicalisation relates to the growing willingness to personally strive for and/or support the above-mentioned change, or to move others to do so\(^5\). These characteristics indicate that the target group, motivation and (group) dynamics can, in the case of radicalisation, differ from general polarisation processes and therefore demand a separate approach.

Here too, the analysis will build upon ongoing projects such as the Action Plan for Polarisation and Radicalisation 2007-2011\(^6\) and the Social Unrest Programme.

Scenarios will be developed for the mid term which will bring into view both the causes and manifestation forms of polarisation and radicalisation.

Polarisation scenarios will be developed for the national risk assessment.

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**Theme: energy supply assurance**

The focus within this theme lies on the assurance of electricity supply. Electricity is becoming increasingly important to our modern society. Civilians, organisations, companies and government have to a large extent grown dependent on the use of electricity. A guaranteed supply of electricity is of vital importance yet subject to a range of potential risks. Recent examples of (relatively minor) power outages, resulting in a temporary loss of electricity supply at local levels, show how vulnerable the system can be. But how exposed is the system exactly, and what is the risk of failures that could lead to large-scale societal disruption? There are also questions about the rising demand for electricity. Is the Netherlands sufficiently prepared for this development? Is enough being invested in expanding production and grid capacity? Electricity generation in the Netherlands is largely dependent on the availability of raw materials such as natural gas and coal. This country’s own gas reserves are gradually becoming depleted, making us increasingly dependent on imports from third (partially non-Western) countries. What kind of risks does this entail for the future? Finally, the safety and security aspects of (un)intentional human actions and (natural) disasters have a major impact on this sector, and thus also on the many other (critical) sectors and processes that are highly dependent on electricity.

It is therefore important to:

1. acquire good insight into the specific threats to security of supply of electricity in the short, mid and long term;
2. to determine which of these threats form a risk that could lead to societal disruption.

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6. In terms of scale, national security has a national focus; the focus of the Action Plan is on (supporting) local management. The national security programme provides insights into possible manifestation forms of polarisation in the Netherlands, also in the mid to long term. With the aid of these insights, municipal authorities can prepare themselves for dealing with (supragregional) risks. Execution of the Action Plan generates insights and information about local threats and resilience, which form the input for the government-wide analysis as part of the national security work method. Furthermore, the indicators used in the polarisation and radicalisation monitor (part of the Action Plan) correspond with those used for analysis and risk assessment within the national security work method.
This analysis will build on ongoing processes such as the Protection of critical infrastructure project, the Interdepartmental Working Group on Security of Energy Supply and on foreign policy in general.

All three themes will benefit from knowledge-sharing and -building by bringing together domestic and foreign government organisations, scientists and private institutions with various perspectives. This will result in reports on the state of affairs, the expected situation and effects (in the short-, mid- and long-term) of the themes. The high-quality findings generated through these analyses are expected to be of great value for the risk assessment, strategic planning and for policy follow-up stages.
The following products will be produced, partly on the basis of the agenda themes.

3.1 **Strategic foresight**

The first report ‘Strategic Foresight for National Security’ will be published in 2007. This report will outline long-term developments with potential impact on national security. The report will identify and explore emerging themes which may be relevant to national security because they can be threats in the long term or opportunities which can be utilised to prevent threats. This report will use inputs from forecasts and trend analyses conducted by planning offices such as the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the Social Cultural Plan Bureau (SCP), the Environmental and Nature Plan Bureau (MNP), the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), and advisory bodies such as the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), the Council for Urban Planning, Environmental and Nature Research (RMNO) and the Social-Economic Council (SER).

A think tank – consisting of leading experts from various fields related to national security – will assess the national security implications of these developments.

3.2 **Mid-term analyses**

In 2007, analyses will be conducted to provide insight into trends and developments in the mid-term. These analyses will be focused on the themes of climate change, polarisation/radicalisation and energy supply assurance. The goal is to enhance knowledge of these themes, to identify new threats, and to unravel new correlations.

3.3 **National risk assessment**

In 2007, the national risk assessment will provide a systematic comparison of the various risk factors within the themes of climate change, polarisation/radicalisation and security of energy supply that affect national security. Both the probabilities of an event happening and its consequences will be considered. For 2008, the ambition is to generate a national risk assessment across the full spectrum of national security, resulting in the report ‘Risk Assessment in the Netherlands’.
3.4 Short-term horizon scanning

In 2007, a report ‘Threat Assessment in the Netherlands’ will be prepared which will at the very least pay attention to the themes of climate change, polarisation/radicalisation and security of energy supply. As of 2008, the ‘Threat Assessment in the Netherlands’ will be prepared over the full range of national security issues.

The report will provide an overview of the most important developments as these have occurred during the preceding three months as well as a horizon-scan of the near-term future (what is coming the Netherlands’ way?).

A cross-analysis will take place between and across the various themes.

3.5 Strategic planning

Based on the findings of the risk assessment, recommendations will be made with the aid of planning assumptions as to whether capabilities must be reinforced, and if so, which. The three themes placed on the agenda are assured of attention in 2007 and 2008.

Also, advice will be given on whether or not to reinforce capabilities that form part of the mass evacuation task. This is a more solution-oriented elaboration of an already defined task in which the government and/or the business community play a role. Completed at the end of 2007, this in-depth analysis will result in an overview of current and desired capabilities in this area.
4 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS

4.1 National network

Building a national network will be an ongoing process. This process will build on existing networks, but will also set up new networks. Knowledge and information are to be exchanged on a structural basis and to be harmonised with yet to be determined target groups, such as the umbrella organisations within both the private and the public sector. On the one hand, networks will be mobilised that pertain to the various themes and tasks. With a view to the intended high-quality interaction between experts, it is important not to ignore ‘original thinkers’ from adjacent disciplines. On the other hand, additional efforts will be made to involve experts at a level which goes beyond the themes. For reasons of support, a communication strategy (including plan and activities) will be drawn up.

4.2 International network

Information about the Dutch approach to reinforcing national security is exchanged at the international level. To this end, an international conference will be convened towards the end of 2007. In addition, bilateral expert meetings are being organised in 2007 with existing international contacts. This will provide an impetus towards a ‘community of best practice’ in which specific knowledge and expertise in national risk assessment, analysis and strategic planning can be exchanged with countries with a comparable approach.
5 PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES

5.1 Authority and control

Concrete proposals for improvement in authority and control in the area of national security will be made in 2007. In close consultation with strongly involved public and private parties, the principles of authority and control as laid out in this strategy will be fleshed out in further detail. The emphasis in 2007 will be on the applicability of these principles within the government. More specifically, the applicability of authority and control principles will be tested against one or more of the agenda themes and against the mass evacuation task.

5.2 Evaluation

An evaluation of the national security method will take place at the end of the work programme. The findings of the evaluation will serve as a first step for the follow-up programme of 2009 and beyond. In the evaluation, attention will in any event be paid to:

- quality of information, of the information exchange and of intermediary products;
- confidentiality of information (necessity and practical realisation);
- clarity of role division and deployment of people;
- practical use for follow-up;
- added value of the working method with respect to current more sector-oriented procedures (review against the starting situation);
- impact (in time) of – components of – the working method on the regular budget planning processes; relationship between strategic planning and the so called VBTB (From Policy Budgets to Policy Accountability).

Evaluation can lead to adjustment (of components) of the working method in order to reinforce national security.

5.3 Quality and policy review

Finally, in 2007 a study will be carried out how to assure the quality of the analysis and assessment procedure through peer review and the need for a security impact assessment of new policy initiatives will be assessed.
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