The EU must reinvigorate its Eastern policy

This piece was first published by Progress on 19 June 2009.

Back in September 2008, the EU reacted to the war in Georgia by deciding to fast-track its proposed ‘Eastern Partnership' for the six east European states left stranded between Russia and the EU as extended in 2004 and 2007 (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). By EU standards, the launch process was fast indeed, with a formal grand summit held in Prague this May to get the Partnership off the ground.

Except the launch was anything but grand. Only Angela Merkel of Europe's big hitters bothered to attend. There was no Brown, no Sarkozy, Zapatero or Berlusconi. Italy sent its minister of welfare. And since the summit, Europe's would-be partners have lurched from one crisis to another. After the violence that followed elections in April, Moldova's deadlocked parliament has twice failed to elect a new president, so new elections will have to be held on 29 July - but with further deadlock the likely result as the ruling Communist party loses key members. Amazingly for those Europeans who shivered in January after Russia's gas supply through Ukraine was cut off, the two countries seem to be heading for yet another gas crisis over the summer. Russia's Gazprom is desperate for cash, and Ukraine has contracted for too much gas at too high a price and struggles to meet every monthly payment. It secured April's gas supply as an advance against transit fees; in May it had to buy back its own government bonds. No one knows how it will pay in the coming months, when it normally fills up its gas storage to last through the winter. Tension between Russia and Georgia rumbles on. Russia has even picked a fight with its traditional friend Belarus over, of all things, the export of milk.

The Eastern Partnership is a welcome initiative, but it is not designed to deal with these sorts of crises. The EU needs to wise up to the fact that its new neighbours are not the relatively stable states it got used to dealing with in the 1990s, when its old neighbours were the likes of Poland or the Czech Republic. They are also states in which Russia is much more of a player. There is a competition for influence, not between spheres of influence, but between the very different models of politics and economics that the EU and Russia have to offer.

The Eastern Partnership urgently needs to be buttressed with policies that address the short-term problems of the region. Countries like Moldova and Ukraine have been hit hard by the economic crisis, but unlike EU states such as Latvia or Hungary, they can only borrow from the IMF (or from Russia). The EU needs to be a more flexible facilitator of extra funds from individual member states or from the EBRD and EIB.

 The EU should pay more attention to the region. It should set up a ‘listening tour' of the region under the Swedish presidency which may sound unlikely but is exactly what the Swedes did last time they held the presidency in 2001.
 
The EU needs to make itself more attractive in the region. One way of doing this would be to invest in new media, as under-developed local markets mean that locals often rely on Russian sources. The EU could also consider offering financial assistance to cover small areas like Moldova and parts of Georgia with wireless internet access, as the United States Agency for International Development did for Macedonia in 2004-05.

Visa-free travel is the most difficult issue, given worries within the EU about immigration and crime, but the most important for the EU's pulling power in the east. EU and Eastern Partnership Interior Ministries should begin work on confidence-building measures under the Swedish presidency. Meanwhile, the EU should work to improve and humanise visa application conditions.

The alternative, if the EU remains relatively passive, is a ring of instability in what is, to repeat the obvious, Europe's neighbourhood. Like the US and Mexico, growing gaps in living standards, in good governance and the rule of law will inevitably flow across borders. ‘Fortress Europe' is not an option. Stability and security in the EU depend on stability and security in the neighbourhood.