(English translation)
The Irish no has made patently clear once again the fracture between the political class and European public opinion. With the exception of the minority Sinn Fein group, the five main parliamentary parties proved themselves incapable of mobilising the Irish people to vote yes. In Parliament, 156 MP’s voted in favour of the Lisbon Treaty and 10 against; but opinion in the country at large was very different, with final results showing 53% against the Treaty and 46.6% in favour of it.
Aware of the lack of popularity of European construction, from the beginning of the decade the European elites have tried to widen their support base with the European public. A Charter of Fundamental Rights was drawn up, followed by a Convention consisting of members of national parliaments, summoned to prepare the way for a Constitution. Finally, a good number of countries decided to call a referendum in order to ratify the resulting document. However, none of these strategies led to the desired effect; France and Holland soon regretted calling a referendum, while Spain and Luxemburg were left smarting by a low turn-out and a narrow margin of victory respectively.
But European leaders decided to ignore the growing breach with their citizens, beginning a new reform process of the Treaties which was designed, from the very outset, to get round the need for any more referenda. The old European Constitution changed its name, was chopped into two and its symbols quietly forgotten. After an eighteen month hiatus, technically described as “a reflection period” but during which reflection was conspicuous by its absence, a new Treaty was drafted behind closed doors. Up until last Thursday, the scheme seemed to have worked well enough, but there were some loose ends which couldn’t quite be tied up, namely, the mandatory Irish referendum. 862.415 Irish voters have tugged away at those loose ends, unraveling a whole process and leaving the Emperor without clothes.
Although the Irish result can’t simply be extended to the rest of the EU (it ought to be remembered that eighteen countries have ratified the Lisbon Treaty to date), mere common sense points to a significant problem for the twenty seven member states. Certainly, for the Reflection Group on the Future of the EU headed by Felipe González, the question of how to widen popular support for the integration process now takes on an absolute, almost life or death priority, because Europe without Europeans is neither viable nor sustainable as a political actor, either in the continent itself or the wider world. It is clear that European integration creates winners and losers, and as long as European and national institutions are incapable of harnessing and channeling the demands of unhappy voters, they are likely to let off steam in the public arena.
As for the short term, doubts about how to extricate Europe from the crisis are more than justified. Plan “A” with all its constitutional fanfare, sank without trace; plan “B”, stripped of such trappings, now also seems headed for failure. The Irish Government suspended ratification of the European Constitution in 2005 on the grounds that it was too ambitious; now it has failed with a more modest text. Should we try again with an even less ambitious draft? Or should 136.964 votes lead us to muddle along with the Treaty of Nice, which everybody knows is inadequate if an enlarged EU is to become a real protagonist on the world stage? Cleary, that is no solution either.
In spite of the desire to find a rapid and painless way out of the crisis, there is no quick fix to the Irish no. The turnout (53.1%) was more than sufficient, higher even than Spain’s in 2005 (42.3%), which makes calling a second referendum with the same question unthinkable. For a second referendum to make any sense, Ireland has to agree on a set of conditions with its partners beforehand (as in the case of the “Decalogue” which the 1986 Spanish referendum on NATO membership was based on). The only problem is voters rejected the Treaty for a variety of often irreconcilable reasons, making it is hard to imagine what safeguards or derogations could keep the Irish people happy.
However, despite these complexities, it does amount to a possible and above all desirable way forward, because it would mean the ratification process could continue. That’s why it’s vital European leaders prevent contagion spreading when the European Council meets this Thursday, hold firm on the ratification timetable, categorically rule out a renegotiation of the whole Treaty and, above all, do all they can to ensure the Treaty comes into effect on January 1st 2009 as planned, or at the very latest, before the European elections in June 2009. If not, those elections might well turn into a real European referendum, with unforeseeable consequences for legitimacy. Clearly, the solution to this crisis has to come from the politicians, not the technocrats.
Translated by Douglas Wilson
El no irlandés ha puesto de manifiesto una vez más la fractura existente entre la clase política y la opinión pública europeas. Excepto el minoritario Sinn Fein, los cinco grandes partidos con representación parlamentaria han sido incapaces de movilizar a los irlandeses a favor del sí. En el Parlamento, 156 diputados votaron a favor del Tratado de Lisboa y 10 en contra; en la calle el resultado ha sido muy distinto: un 53% votó en contra y un 46,6% a favor.
Desde comienzos de la década, las élites europeas, conscientes de la escasa popularidad de la construcción europea, han intentado ampliar su base de apoyo ciudadana: primero fue la redacción de una Carta de Derechos Fundamentales, después la convocatoria de una Convención integrada por parlamentarios nacionales que preparara un proyecto de Constitución y, finalmente, un buen número de países decidieron recurrir al referéndum para ratificar el texto resultante. Sin embargo, estas estrategias no dieron el resultado esperado: Francia y Holanda pronto se arrepintieron de haber convocado referendos, mientras que España y Luxemburgo salieron escaldados por la baja participación, en el primer caso, y por lo ajustado de la victoria, en el segundo.
Pero los líderes europeos decidieron ignorar la brecha ciudadana, iniciando un nuevo proceso de reforma de los tratados, diseñado, desde un principio, para sortear los refrendos. La vieja Constitución europea se cambió de nombre, se troceó en dos y fue despojada de sus símbolos. Tras un parón de 18 meses, técnicamente denominado "periodo de reflexión" pero en la que ésta brilló por su ausencia, se pergeñó, a puerta cerrada y en pocos meses, un nuevo tratado. Hasta el jueves, la conjura funcionó, pero debido a las peculiaridades de Irlanda, donde el referéndum es obligatorio, las élites dejaron un pequeño fleco. Y hete aquí, que tirando de ese fleco, 862.415 irlandeses han dejado al emperador desnudo.
Por ello, aunque el resultado en Irlanda no pueda extenderse sin más al resto de la UE (no debe olvidarse que 18 países han ratificado hasta la fecha el Tratado de Lisboa), el sentido común no deja de indicar que los Veintisiete se enfrentan con un problema de gran calado. Desde luego, para el Grupo de Reflexión sobre el Futuro de la UE que lidera Felipe González, la cuestión de cómo ampliar el apoyo popular al proceso de integración adquiere a partir de ahora una prioridad absoluta, casi existencial, porque una Europa sin europeos no es viable ni sostenible como actor político, ni en Europa ni en el mundo. Está claro que la integración europea genera ganadores y perdedores: por ello, mientras las instituciones, nacionales y europeas, no sean capaces de arbitrar y canalizar las demandas de los descontentos, la presión se desbordará por la vía popular.
Más a corto plazo, las dudas respecto a qué hacer para salir de esta crisis están más que justificadas. El plan A incluía toda la fanfarria constitucional y naufragó; el plan B, despojado del concepto constitucional, también parece ahora abocado al fracaso. El Gobierno irlandés suspendió en 2005 la ratificación de la Constitución Europea, alegando que era un texto demasiado ambicioso; ahora ha fracasado con un texto cicatero. ¿Debemos probar con un texto menos ambicioso aún? ¿Conformarnos, debido a 136.964 votos de diferencia en Irlanda, con un Tratado de Niza que sabemos que no es apto para hacer de la UE ampliada a Veintisiete un actor de talla mundial? Claramente, no.
Pese a los deseos de encontrar una salida fácil y rápida, el no tiene una muy difícil solución. Por un lado, la participación (53,1%) ha sido más que suficiente, superior incluso a la que registró el referéndum en España en 2005 (42,3%), lo que hace impensable convocar un segundo referéndum con la misma pregunta. Para que un segundo referéndum tuviera sentido, Irlanda debería pactar de antemano con sus socios una serie de condiciones (como en el caso del decálogo en el que se basó la consulta sobre la OTAN en España en 1986). El problema es que las razones del rechazo son tan diversas, e incluso tan irreconciliables entre sí, que resulta difícil imaginar qué salvaguardias o derogaciones podrían satisfacer al pueblo irlandés. Sin embargo, pese a la complejidad, es una vía posible, y sobre todo, deseable, porque no obligaría a suspender el proceso de ratificación.
Por ello, lo esencial es que este jueves, en el Consejo Europeo, los líderes europeos eviten el efecto contagio, manteniendo a toda costa el calendario de ratificación, descartando una renegociación global del tratado y sobre todo, haciendo todo lo posible para que el texto entre en vigor, como estaba previsto, el 1 de enero de 2009 o, a más tardar, antes de las elecciones europeas de junio de 2009. De lo contrario, éstas sí que podrían convertirse en un referéndum europeo de imprevisibles consecuencias deslegitimadoras. Claramente, la solución a esta crisis tiene que venir de la mano de la política, no de la técnica jurídica.
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2 Comments
Pressing ahead with the ratification in other countries is a reasonable short-term fix. However, as the author of this article appears to be aware, there is a larger problem of a disconnect between those making decisions at the European level and those who are not.
It appears that the essence of that problem is that people do not feel that they know what is happening in Brussels, and why. I can see two root reasons for this:
1. The media coverage of European issues is sparse and often of low quality.
2. Member state leaders do not put much effort into justifying the results of their negotiations to their home publics.
Point 1 can be addressed by creating something like a European equivalent of BBC. Maybe there are also barriers to private European mass media that should be removed.
I am less certain about how to address Point 2. It seems that currently there are not incentives for member state politicians to justify European level decisions, and it is not within the mandate of the technocrats to do this. The most attractive option is to introduce more direct democracy at the European level. This will force the politicians to have the public on board.
Recognizing Irish citizens as knowlegable instead of fearful can only move the EU effort forward.