The NATO Secretary-General must secretly be thanking Russia. Not since the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact have the allies been able to pull together in quite the same way as following Russia's invasion of Georgia.
At an emergency meeting - the first in a long time - the foreign ministers of NATO's 26 member states stopped short of calling for an end to the NATO-Russia Council, but their tone was clear. As the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, "We cannot continue with business as usual." The Alliance will now develop a NATO-Georgia Commission, is sending experts to assess damage to the country's infrastructure and will review the state of Georgia's security forces, presumably with a view to rebuilding these.
Whilst it is easy to expose cracks in the alliance - Germany and France remain more sceptical of Georgian NATO membership than the U.S. and Britain - and the outcome of the NATO summit in December 2008 is still hard to predict, for the first time in decades all allies agree that NATO should not only be a niche provider of stability operations - as it seemed the U.S wanted - but a forum for trans-Atlantic political debate and full-spectrum operations, from stability to deterrence and conventional warfare.
Though NATO's decision to send a team of 15 civil emergency planning experts to help Georgia assess damage to its civil infrastructure may look insignificant - it represents a fundamental break with the Alliance's military-only stance.
Until now, NATO has been quick to say that development and security are inter-dependent and that it should adopt a so-called ‘comprehensive approach' to its operations, for example in Afghanistan. But many allies have been lukewarm on this initiative, fearing that NATO would encroach on the EU's territory. But if the NATO team is seen as successful, it may portend the development of new civil-military capabilities. Inside NATO, practice drives doctrinal development, which in turn drives future practice.
Again, thanks to Russia, this new-look NATO is likely to continue well into a new U.S administration. While it has long been thought that a new U.S president, whether Barack Obama or John McCain, would give the Alliance the benefit of the doubt - most analysts believed until recently that U.S defense multilateralism would be contingent upon European support for NATO's Afghan mission. When he spoke in Berlin, Barack Obama demanded that European NATO allies send more troops there and his presidential foe, John McCain, has made similar statements. But with Russian tanks in Georgia and nuclear threats towards Poland, nobody today believes that the U.S return to NATO will depend on sending more European troops to the Hindu Kush.
Finally, while Russia may have wanted to lay a marker down, stopping the seemingly endless expansion of NATO, its actions may have made the West's embrace of both Georgian and Ukraine more rather than less likely.
However, NATO's new-found unity and purpose has its challenges too. The Alliance still faces a number of operational tests, as the death of 10 French soldiers in Afghanistan yesterday showed. It also needs to reform itself to improve both current and future operations. Reforms required include adjustments to NATO's command structures, changes in the way NATO missions are financed and improvements in its capacity to build indigenous security forces in and before combat.
The unity may dissipate as Russian forces begin withdrawing from Georgia. But even if this happens, thanks to Moscow NATO's 60th anniversary in 2009 presents an opportunity to revitalize the world's premier security organization and following this year's US presidential election, to re-build a consensus on Euro-Atlantic security. Nothing could be further from Russia's ambition and better for Europe and the U.S.
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I read the outcome of the NATO Council rather differently Daniel. I think it produced minimalist conclusions - in large measure because very many members are doubtful about extending membership to Georgia, Ukraine and others. Indeed given the US/UK military resource crisis (thanks to the ill considered ventures in Iran and Afghanistan) it is not clear that extending such “membership” would be militarily meaningful. That said I accept the Georgia crisis (the product of a Saakashvilli’s adventurism and Russian arrogance) requires a response. It is more than hightime for the EU to agree on just what eventual relationship it is aiming at with Ukraine, Georgia and indeed (hopefully) a future democratic Russia if - as I believe - classical enlargement will reach its limit with the western Balkana. I have written a paper on this for Sussex University European Institute which may be of interest in this context.
Two questions on Russia’s recogntiion of Abkhazia, S Ossetia (for ANGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE)
1) To what extent is this payback for Kosovo?
2) What effect do youth ink it will have on the upcoming EU summit?
Thanks in advance,
Paul Harrington AFP 00322308394
This is a slightly amended version of something I posted elsewhere.
NATO needs to reconsider our relationship with the Ukraine. Some sort of external association with NATO, short of full membership but with guarantees for the country?s security if attacked would seem to be the best immediate option.
The troops that Russia used to carry out the invasion of Georgia were moved to the adjoining areas of Russia for ?military exercises? in July 2008, that is several weeks before the alleged ?provocation? by Georgia.
The invasion was clearly Putin?s desired outcome. The use of a Georgian attack as a reason is just an excuse. South Ossetia was previously a patchwork quilt of government and separatist held areas. There was often fighting between the two sides. Once the Russian army was in place all they had to do was wait and eventually there would be something to excuse the invasion
Russia is playing a long term game. Its primary objective is to turn Europe into a Russian sphere of influence. It is achieving this goal spectacularly well, largely because so much of the strategy is going undetected.
This is not something which can be achieved militarily. Russia has a much smaller economy and population than western Europe, albeit his military is bigger and has a vastly greater nuclear potential. The basic method Putin is using is divide and conquer. Most western European countries are much stronger than Russia economically, but all are relatively weak militarily. Putin?s strategy is to divide Western Europe from Eastern Europe, to allow him to absorb Eastern Europe.
Russian increase in its sphere of influence is something which can be achieved by a combination of measures. Russia is in the process of developing an economic stranglehold over European energy supplies, this will be used to bully the western European powers. Eastern European countries in general have virtually no military capacity, so despite their loathing of Russia they would be easy prey to an actual invasion. Once the west of Europe is weakened, it won?t lift a finger to save the East; naively they will sacrifice others believeing that this will save themselves.
There seem to be 2 things that need to be done to prevent Russian expansionism. Challenge the economic aspects and challenge the military aspects. Challenging the economic aspects means developing alternative energy sources. Unfortunately the main viable alternative gas sources come through Georgia at the moment. This means pressurising Russia over Georgia, and trying to make peace between Armenia and Azerbijan, thus opening up the only other alternative route.
Challenging the military aspects means preventing future Russian military adventurism, like that witnessed in Georgia. Unfortunately it is now too late to prevent a Russian invasion of Georgia, it has already happened. Russia has used the invasion to completely destroy the much smaller Georgian military. Small countries need to ally themselves to bigger ones to assist in their defence. The chances of increasing western influence in any part of the world will be very small if small countries believe that it will open them up to attack from Russia.
In Europe the most likely next areas of Russian military adventurism are Moldova and Ukraine. Both are poor countries and both have territorial disputes either with Russia (Crimea, especially Sevastapol and Crimean lighthouses in the Ukraine) or Russian backed separatists (Transdnister in Moldova).
I am unsure what could be done to boost Moldova. It is desperately poor with no military. Transdneister is not recognised and survives on organized crime and Russian subsidies, so it is not susceptible to economic presures.
Ukrine is a different matter. It could be brought more into the NATO sphere of influence. The purpose of allowing Ukraine under a NATO umbrella (perhaps not by full NATO membership - maybe some temporary guarantee together with stationing NATO troops/air power there) would be to deter a Russian attack there. Ukraine has a large population and unlike eastern Europe generally, it seems to have large, though poorly equipped army. It is a sitting duck in a war with Russia due to its poor air forces. Increase these and perhaps it will stand a fighting chance.
The idea that this would antagonise Russia is a valid concern, however the fact that refusing NATO membership did not pacify Russia, but left it with impunity to attack, shows that this might work. After all the Russians eventually backed down on Estonia last year.
A temporary pact is preferable to full NATO membership at the moment, as many Ukrainians oppose NATO membership and the country itself is often divided between pro and anti Russian forces. If the pro-Russians won the next election we would not want to be committed to their defence.
RE: What effect do you think it will have on the upcoming EU summit?
THAT IS THE QUESTION! Lithuania and other EE countries are hanging in the (energy) balance here.
Doubtless, that the current scenario of standing up unified against Russia was something expected. However, this emergency meeting dealt with this hot topic rather warm headedly. No question, this quick response is well applaud in Washington, but I’m raising my eyebrows on Mr Korski’s notion of its’ benefits for Europe.
This council often raises the thought of European unified foreign and military policy. A strong NATO will just hold back ambitions of developing EU military. And hence European independence. What do I mean, by that?
If the EU wants to take advantage of this conflict, it does stand on new grounds with Russia. But rather steps closer than further. How does this community imagines its future when acts like the puppet of the US but gets its everyday supply from Russia?
Finding the right balance could make the EU a global player, but we have to understand that the big bear wants more from that cake, too.
What is better for us? A world order of the US or, strengthening Russia for competing? Monopoly or duopoly? Obviously, in long-term, if the EU wants to be anything it wont grow under one power.
Dear David and John,
Thank you for your thoughtful comments. To be clear, I don?t think that NATO is the only answer for US/European action towards Russia. In fact, NATO can only play a limited role, as we need to use the EU carrot more effectively. Any long-term, comprehensive embrace of Ukraine and Georgia by the EU will be far more effective than use of a NATO stick.
But an EU policy needs to be anchored in a transatlantic consensus rather than, as some would have it, European solo play. And, secondly, European leaders need to maintain EU unity. This will be tricky as the rifts inside the EU are apparent. Writing this from Berlin, I am struck by how likely it is that Germany will go alone, abandoning other allies, if the going against Russia gets too tough.
Thinking longer-term, to solidify the US-European flank against Russia, Europeans will have to work with the new US administration to improve US-EU links, thinking up innovative ways such as granting U.S Observer Status at every GAERC (or every final sessions of a GAERC) and asking a new U.S president to send a serious, high-level envoy to represent the US at the EU.
But to me it is undeniable that until we develop such a new institutional framework for transatlantic relations, NATO is moving from a period of strategic confusion towards a much clearer sense of purpose. I don?t think we will hear more of ?coalitions of the willing?, talk of European weakness or the notion that ISAF is NATO. This is vital and, in part, down to Russia?s behavior.
Dear Peter,
I don?t think that the EU is a puppet of the U.S (is there a more over-used metaphor out there?) or that NATO?s development is necessarily contrary to the growth of a robust ESDP. That kind of inimical, either-or policy belongs to a different era and is not relevant today. Ask Angela Merkel or Nicolas Sarkoy, neither of whom see ESDP and NATO as inimical.
You say the choice is between a power monopoly or duopoly. I?m afraid it is not that simple anymore. Russia is in no position, politically, militarily or even culturally to challenge the U.S. For a great description of Russian problems see Ivan Krastev?s informative piece. But the US (and the West more generally) will decline in the coming years as China and the BRICS grow more powerful.
The key is to try to find common solutions to world problems and develop the ability for the EU to act independently when required. But the EU must be more than a petulant child, struggling to break free from a parental embrace for no other reason than to break free. We have to take responsibility for dealing with global issues, which more often that not, will require cooperation with the U.S.
Finally on gas. Yes many EU countries rely on Russia ? but that also means that Moscow relies on the EU market. To improve the EU?s position, Pierre Noel says ?a European integrated and flexible gas market would make eastern Europe more secure, just as it would make the relationship between Gazprom and large utility importers in Germany, Italy or France less cosy.? As he goes on to say: ?This is a better position from which to speak with one voice to Moscow.?
Dear Val,
I hope the EU leaders will follow up the six-point peace agreement with a comprehensive regional strategy for Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. It should also push for an international peacekeeping mandate in Georgia?s secessionist regions, and take the lead in the post-conflict reconstruction effort. Then the EU should strengthen its membership pledge toward Ukraine and Moldova, speed up negotiations with Georgia on a free trade agreement, agree on a visa facilitation deal, and offer Neighbourhood Policy benefits (funding, trade and infrastructure projects) to the secessionist regions, too.
No doubt some EU leaders will want to add punitive measures against Russia. But while Moscow is not immune to international pressure, there is probably little the EU can do in the short-term. Better, therefore, to pay particular attention to developments in Ukraine ? so to avoid a new-style ?domino effect? ? and begin the long-term embrace of Georgia. That does not mean giving Georgia NATO membership, just as Turkey?s negotiations with the EU do not amount to automatic membership. But it means putting the country back on the road.
Thanks for the response.
One of the noticeable things about the current crisis is that NATO seems better equipped to deal with it than the EU. This is largely because NATO has a much more limited remit.
In the longer term this does not bode well for the EU. Europe cannot speak with one voice over Russia because European countries interests in Russia are very divergent. In particular I fear that Germany would rather sacrifice Estonia (for example) to Russia and get cheap gas than stand up for Estonian independence from Russia. It is difficult to imagine, for example, California sacrificing Idaho to Canada to get cheap water. Nation states generally have some sense of solidarity with their fellow citizens that seems lacking in Europe.
Peter when I read your comment about “strengthening Russia for competing” it seems that you are referring to giving eastern European states to Russia. Maybe this is not what you mean, but it certainly seems to be implied. I fail to see how any state strengthens its independence by doing such a thing.
The only way to end the divisions in Europe over Russia seems to be to get an alternative gas source. Azerbaijan seems the best alternative, Russia’s moves in Georgia have effectively cut off the pipelines. Perhaps a European initiative to make peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be something of a start, though Europe would need to have some sort of military potential there to deter a further Russian invasion. Again NATO seems better equipped than the EU for the military side of things, though the EU should be looking at the political side.
Nonono,
we are not giving Estonia nor anything from Eastern Europe. We are all aware of Russia’s incapability compared to the US. There’s no question in this regard. The only doubt I’m raising when I see American news deliberately manipulating the population, I see the FT.com emphasising the sanctions, and not the reasons. No one in Europe even questioned the authenticity of what we hear about the conflict. There are witnesses stating that among Georgian soldiers there were some with US badges, there are reports on the brutality of the Saakashvili regime, but not in our mass media. No European news channel even mention the case of Kosovo when talking about South Ossetia.
I’m just emphasising that we do not have a clear picture, but already punishing someone.
The only thing, we supposed to give to Russia, is our understanding, and simply listen to them.
By the way, does any of you read any other material than western?
Regarding, alternative energy. Utterly agree. But no gaspipes, no Azerbaijan. Real Alternatives. There are some projects like hydrosol from the EU commission, but I cannot see the mass distribution of it. Japan already running some of his cars on water, but we still using our barbaric energy of burning fossil fuels. And just to mention Nicola Tesla…
Peter thanks for the clarification.
Unfortunately, I think we will not be in agreement about gas pipelines. When it comes to alternative energy sources the barbaric burning of fossil fuels or the fission of nuclear materials are the only viable options at the moment. I suppose nothing in life is cost free. Unless there is a dramatic breakthrough in nuclear fusion this will probably be the case for some time to come.
Wind, sun, wave power and biofuels are not realistically going to provide more than a small fraction of Europe’s energy needs. They should be developed of course, after all with a viable alternative to oil Russia would be out of business and the Middle East would be no more strategic than Africa. At the moment though we cannot rely on alternatives to generate much power.
I don’t have the relevant language skills to look too much into non-western news sources. Pravda has an English language website, but last time I looked it was a bit like the National Inquirer, with lots of space alien stories. When I lived on the continent I watched Russian TV a bit on cable, but it seemed quite awful. I always mean to get round to learning Russian, but to date I haven’t managed.
Dear David… Are you out of your mind? Russia cannot challenge US culturally?? USA has NO culture whatsoever!! If I remember history correctly - EVERYTHING has been brought from different countries to the USA of today… On the other side Moscow has been built long before America (so-called) was even discovered, so please, stop being one-side-pro-American person and start learning some other language (Russian included) to see the real world and learn some real Culture.