Dobro do?li to the Balkans, Baroness Ashton

Catherine Ashton can be excused for feeling a bit depressed. No matter what she does or where she goes, the criticism rains down on her like a familiar downpour in her native Lancashire. Now that she has set off on her first official foreign trip, to the Balkans, people are grumbling that she should have gone somewhere more foreign, like the Middle East.

This criticism is not only a reflection of the High Representative's stature, but reflects a different malaise: European governments are bored of the Balkans. Having been a central theme of foreign policy debates in the 1990s, the region now excites nobody but a dwindling band of experts. Communiqués by EU meetings have different dates, but the content is largely the same: they identify and laud progress but exhort more effort. Ask for a list of the EU's top foreign policy priorities and the Balkans is likely to figure far down.

Many European foreign ministers see this as a sign of the Union's success. From a region torn apart in the mid-1990s, a new one has emerged helped by the "push" of ESDP missions and the "pull" of Euro-Atlantic accession. Recent good news on visas and membership applications has added to this storyline. Given this real but insufficient progress, most EU leaders would probably agree that the Balkans are exactly where they ought to be: not in the EU, where they could ruin the fragile post-Lisbon project, but not so far away that they are driven to despair and self-destruction.

But dig beneath the headlines and a number of problems remain that will require considered EU attention. The first has to do with the EU. Though all member-states in principle accept that the region belongs in the EU, they do not agree on how quickly membership should be doled out. A few EU governments like Austria, Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania and Sweden would fast-track accession for most of the Balkan countries.

Keenly aware that the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria has reduced popular appetite for enlargement in parts of the EU, countries like Germany, France and the Benelux countries would prefer to postpone EU membership for as long as possible, with the exception of Croatia's bid. A final group of countries -- Denmark, Britain, Spain - are pro-enlargement, but join forces with the two bigger groupings depending on the issue at hand (or because of special concerns e.g. over Kosovo's independence).

The division among member-states has, in turn, had a number of effects. It has resulted in a number of EU countries reverting to bilateral, rather than common policies to achieve their objectives. Greece's dispute with Macedonia and Slovenia's block on Croatia's EU admission are only the most high-profile examples. To the list can be added Bulgaria's new Macedonia policy, or Italy's support for the Albanian government.

Another effect of the stasis has been more local. The region's leaders have learned to use the EU's approach for their own internal purposes while EU's use of diplomatic language is often open to interpretation. The region's leaders - such as Sali Berisha in Albania, Milorad Dodik in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nikola Gruevski in Macedonia and Milo Djukanovic in Montenegro - have understood that visa-free travel will help them maximise votes and therefore work hard to get on the Schengen ‘white list'. Yet their eagerness for administrative reforms remains skin-deep. In most cases, they have used the accession process to centralise powers and to provide benefits to a close-knit group of followers, be they family, clan or party members.

Finally, the division has impacted the EU's ability to act decisively when it has been challenged. This is particularly problematic in the region's three remaining flashpoints; Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Take the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Milorad Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska, has challenged the international community's writ and walked dangerously close to secessionist policies. EU reactions have been feeble.

To some, this means that the EU's accession process does not work and should be fundamentally rethought. But while it is true to say that it cannot solve every regional problem, particularly ethno-national differences inside Bosnia and the Kosovo-Serbian dispute, it has in fact been a lot more effective than it is given credit for and can continue to be in the future. The EU only needs to adapt these policies for the particular environment of the Balkans. Luckily, the EU may already have provided a template for how this can work: Some of the answer may lie in the case of visa liberalisation.

The visa liberalisation process has shown it can catalyse reforms and invigorate administrative capacities even in states that are usually thought of as having weak administrations (such as Bosnia).  The EU should build on this experience by cherry-picking parts of the aquis, promising that the aspirant states can, in a piecemeal manner, gain the benefits of EU membership provided that they reform. This is exactly what has happened on visa liberalisation. An attractive part of the aquis - freedom of travel inside the EU - was broken off from the whole and the region's countries were made to reform. Because the process was transparent, regionally competitive and popular with citizens, it worked to drive reform, even in countries and at times when not much else worked, as in Bosnia.

To make this strategy even more effective it will be key to open negotiations on the extra-aquis areas with all the countries at the same time - in a kind of a ‘preparatory regatta', thus putting them in the ‘waiting room' of the EU in a more structured way. Like on visa liberation, the pressure not to be outdone by ones' neighbours would create incentives for governments to reform in the targeted areas. Take services. If a Serbian company can offer services inside the EU on par with British or Polish businesses, then the impact could be profound - and the prospects of access to these markets useful as a pressure on aspirant governments to genuinely reform.

To undertake this kind of cherry-picking/regatta, the countries need to be given candidate status. However, that should be within reach for each country except Kosovo and Bosnia. The argument against granting the countries candidate status is that doing so would lend pressure to start accession talks immediately, something there is little appetite for in the EU. But Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and Turkey were all given candidate status and had accession talk deferred. For example Turkey was granted candidate status in 1999 but did not begin accession talks before 2005.

Cherry-picking, however, is only part of the answer. An additional element is needed. The EU should find ways to extend a core EU approach - cohesion policies and funds - to the Balkans sooner than when the countries are in the last stretches of the accession process. Cohesion policies are about closing the development gap between less and more developed regions inside the EU. They go along with institution-building efforts, which are all about national development policies. Opening up the EU's cohesion instruments before accession negotiations worked well in other countries, for example in Poland and Romania, but promises to have an even bigger impact in the Balkans, given the underdevelopment of the region's industry and agriculture.

This new policy will not, however, work in one country, Kosovo, and will not be enough in another, Bosnia. As long as five EU states refuse to recognise its independence, Kosovo cannot hope to engage in the accession-like process.  If politics is the art of the possible, the same can be said of the EU accession process. If the EU applied an accession-like policy to Kosovo, it would probably do more to help the newly-independent country than the 1800 policemen currently deployed. But it cannot.

Then there is Bosnia-Herzegovina. Past experience shows that the sovereignty issue does not necessarily prevent an EU reform dialogue with selected agencies or institutions - but that such progress does not change underlying problems. In the run-up to the 2010 elections, there may be little outsiders can do. What needs to be done - e.g. bold action such as organising a referendum on the country's EU membership, preventative deployment of troops etc - seems beyond the international community at present. So the best strategy may be to prevent a referendum (including forcibly, if necessary), but minimize European involvement in the campaign, yet pressure the Serbian and Croatian governments to make a joint statement on their respect for Bosnia's territorial integrity.

The cases of Kosovo and Bosnia show that the EU will have to find different ways to apply the policy in different Balkan countries. In Bosnia, the EU will do it in parallel to addressing the role of the OHR, alongside Republika Srpska's brinkmanship and the Federation's dysfunction. Vis-à-vis Serbia, the bloc will have to develop a post-ICJ policy, so as not to be undermined by Belgrade's diplomatic legerdemain - right now, Serbia looks better prepared for a judgement than European governments. Over Macedonia, the EU will have to get tough on their fellow EU member, Greece, at a time when the Athens government is already under a lot of pressure.

All of this will require far more push than a mere Enlargement Commissioner can muster. As the EU's top diplomat Catherine Ashton can, however, provide the necessary focus for a re-thinking of Europe's Balkan policy. Her visit to the region is a hopefully a step in this direction - and should be welcomed by all, rather than be criticised for what it is not.