A backdoor guest?

This article first appeared on E!Sharp

President José Manuel Barroso intends to host Uzbek President Islam Karimov on January 24 for the first time since the Andizhan massacre, the European Commission said on Monday. Not only has the decision to do so raised eyebrows, but the Commission's evasive handling of the event has added fuel to the fire.

The first date announced for Karimov's arrival was a week later than the actual one, and the meeting will not be followed by a press conference as is the custom when a head of state visits Brussels, giving the whole affair an even more shadowy and opaque feel.

The Commission's spokespeople have said that one aim of the discussion is to sign an energy memorandum, as part of a wider programme of "constructive engagement" with Uzbekistan, which also includes issues on which the EU and Uzbekistan do no see eye to eye, such as human rights. Even if a few references to human-rights abuses do sneak onto the agenda, it is doubtful that this high-level discussion will be much more "constructive" than any of the annual human-rights dialogues between the EU and Uzbekistan, or indeed that the Commission is really motivated by this aspect of the meeting. What matters here is energy.

The EU’s efforts to confront Uzbekistan over the 13th May 2005 Andizhan killings - when Uzbek government security forces fired on a demonstration, killing hundreds of people - have been characterised by these knee-jerk changes of priority, and a failure to see any policy through in a consistent way. In the immediate aftermath of the killings, the EU’s priority was indeed human rights. An arms embargo and other smart sanctions were placed on Uzbekistan, and the EU’s "partnership and cooperation agreement framework" was partially suspended.

In 2007, the EU launched a human rights dialogue with Taskhent. But only two years later, its sanctions were dropped despite a lack of commitment from the Uzbek side, a reported worsening of repression in the country in 2008 and 2009, and no credible investigation being allowed into the Andizhan events. Strong pressure came from Berlin to do so, because the Germans were reluctant to allow the sanctions to jeopardise their use of a strategic airbase in Uzbekistan.

If the EU continues to be a feather to every different wind that the Uzbek government blows in from the east, we can hardly expect to make sustainable progress on any area of interest, let alone something as sensitive as respect for human rights within Uzbekistan’s borders. Rather than basing each new policy of engagement on short-term events or opportunities, a frank discussion is needed about the EU’s various interests in relation to Uzbekistan, and how these can be moulded into a sustainable foreign policy strategy.

A week ahead of the EU’s final decision on the sort of visa bans to apply and on which assets to freeze in response to the crackdown on post-election opposition last December in Belarus, the Uzbekistan experience serves as a timely reminder that punitive EU measures can only work if they are targeted on an area of genuine vulnerability for the government in question, and if there is a collective and sustained commitment from all EU member states to see them through. There also needs to be a sense of logic and proportion in the EU’s sanctions strategy if it is not to be accused of double standards in its treatment of different partners. If these conditions are not met, then the Belarusian government too will simply sit it out and wait for the EU’s tack to change.