Almost exactly two months since the rigged presidential elections in Belarus, the trials of civic activists who took part in the post-election protests – including five former presidential candidates – have begun. Forty-two people are accused of committing a ‘crime of mass riot’ under Belarusian law. Judging by the first ruling, which yesterday left Vasil Pafyankou sentenced to four years in prison and a fine of $7400 to cover costs related to inflicting damage on state property, the omens for the remaining 41 indicted are not good. As one of the best Belarusian analysts Vitali Silitski argues in his recent article, Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka seems to have decided to go for the Cuban approach. During its more than 40 years in power, Fidel Castro’s has regime forced some dissidents leave the country and turned the rest into hostages (Fidel’s brother Raol, who now de facto rules the country, has not departed from the strategy). As a result, isolation has made it easy to govern by autocratic rule despite the fact that the economy has been hugely damaged. Lacking presence and influence, neither the EU nor the US can change much on the island.
While the trials against the activists are new, the question for the EU remains the same as it was in the immediate aftermath of the 19th December protests: how should it engage with a regime that so brutally repressed a peaceful demonstration and is now determined to lock up its opponents for years to come? Together with Balazs Jarabik and Andrew Wilson, we gave an answer earlier January: isolating Belarus is not the way forward. If the EU aims to have an influence in Belarus, it cannot disappear from the country – which is precisely what would happen if we turn our back on Minsk. The gathering of EU and US government and non-government donors in February proved that Europeans and Americans are able to mobilise resources for the support of civil society and these need to be translated into concrete assistance projects as soon as possible. But as the trials with the activists continue, we are likely to see many more – and harsher - sentences. If this is the case, the EU would do well to avoid repeating our mistakes in Cuba. Therefore, while the EU was right to freeze political contacts with Belarus at the highest level, it should remain committed to pursuing dialogue with those elements in the government who have not taken part in the protests and are interested in greater cooperation with the EU. So the logical reaction of the EU to the trials would not be to shut the political dialogue completely, as some now argue, but instead, be consistent in our own approach. The current list of people on EU’s visa ban must be as flexible as possible and we should be ready to add on it those involved in the unfair trials – including the judges who are handing out the politically-motivated sentences. Meanwhile, to increase the pressure on the regime, the EU should start preparing an analysis of potential impact of economic sanctions on Belarus – the fact that the EU is seriously considering this tool and the prospect of actual implementation would give the EU additional leverage in its relations with Minsk.
Belarus is not Cuba in many ways; for one thing, to emigrate from Belarus, one can simply take the car or train, rather than rely on often hand-made and feeble vessels, so the risks of escaping from their country are actually much lower for democracy-minded Belarusians than for Cubans. Yet the spectre of a Cuban-style scenario is looming over Belarus. Whether it prevails mainly depends on Lukashenka, but it would be a mistake for the EU not to try to prevent it.
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