The European Council on Foreign Relations

Germany in Europe: Berlin as seen from Belgrade

Date: 22nd September 2011  |  Author: Ulrike Guérot,

Categories: Germany in Europe,
Tags: None

Last week, I attended the First Belgrade Security Forum and it was nice to see a flourishing Belgrade – I haven’t been for five years or so and the city has developed nicely in that time – but also to be surrounded by people from the Western Balkans who actually still hold the EU in high esteem. It was hard to explain to them that the EU is perhaps no longer the haven of security and prosperity they dream of, and that people in Berlin, London and Paris no longer wake up in the morning and think about Kosovo, Bosnia or the dispute over the Macedonian name.

Economy is the new security in the EU. In Belgrade, by contrast, security is still security – be it hard or soft – in a way the European West has forgotten about. The Western Balkans aren’t post-modern yet. In some respects, therefore, the discussions at the conference seemed old fashioned to the (very few) participants from EU countries who attended. Notably, my panel with Charles Grant, François Heisbourg and István Gyarmati, which was supposed to be on the European Security Perspective, turned out to be a panel on the euro and perspectives on a possible break-up.

The chasm between four frustrated EU citizens and a Balkan public who were trying to showcase all their achievements in order to demonstrate that they qualify for EU membership after a lost decade soon became apparent. They have improved regional cooperation, they have arrested the war criminals, they have common infrastructure projects – as the first panel on regional cooperation with four foreign ministers (Karel Schwarzenberg, János Martonyi, Nickolay Mladenov, Vuk Jeremic) from the region highlighted. They have complied with visa regulation regimes, improved passport security and are pooling competences to work further on the acquis communautaire. In short, they are transforming themselves into beautiful brides, for an EU that neither cares about marriage nor is able to deliver much any more.

ECFR has already argued, in a recent paper, that the EU should move beyond wait-and-see politics, as the promise of EU integration is the political glue that holds the Balkans together – but only if the promise is tangible and clear. Kosovo, for sure, is still a problem. However, Merkel’s refusal to give candidate status to Serbia unless it recognises a fully independent Kosovo is attacked by Serbs, most of whom say that will never happen. Boris Tadić is pretty outspoken about what many of his countrymen define as a ‘Northern Ireland’ solution, and most Serbs and many others from nearby states condemn Germany for blocking progress for Serbia and thus for the whole region.

Yet many in the region also understand that Berlin is the new Brussels. ‘We all look at you on any question: what will Berlin say?’ a Bulgarian Diplomat friend told me. So perhaps it’s time for Germany to draw attention to the Balkans again, but also to link them to the ongoing euro crisis. If the latter eventually leads to a core or two-speed Europe, the region surrounding this ‘core’ will also need to be shaped. Yet at present, the Balkans are not even an outer circle, but a blank within EU thinking.

Charles Grant suggested in his panel contribution that we should envisage a Europe with three circles: the future euro-core Europe (let’s call it ‘Eurobonds-Europe,’ with all that this would imply); the outer circle of EU members (with most having an ‘opt-in’ into the core) and finally a circle of ‘friends’ of the EU. He did not exclude the possibility that the UK might someday switch from EU membership to ‘friend’ status. Another possible contender for ‘friend’ status is Turkey, a state whose interest in accession, like the probability of it happening, has almost certainly peaked. Turkey has started to develop its own strategic interests in the Balkan region and beyond, and is visibly downgrading its eagerness to join to the EU. Regional power ambitions doesn't go along with EU membership – that's the one consistent view across the German press in response to Abdullah Gül’s recent visit to Berlin.

Whatever the solution ultimately is, it’s time to think about the EU’s core and surroundings together in a broad strategic vision for the EU as a whole. The problem is that deepening and widening have been out of sync for some time. The EU cannot deepen at 27, nor can it enlarge in its current state. Therefore, the idea of creating a core of Eurobond countries, which develop deeper political and economic bonds in a way that is subsequently attractive to the states of the outer circle, has some charm. Such a concerted round of ‘deepening’ must occur before enlargement can again be considered, including in the Balkans. Germany is the key to completing both bits of unfinished business – the euro and the Balkans (see Stephen Larrabee’s opinion in the ISS quarterly newsletter for more on this ‘unfinished business’). There is much to do. On both on the euro and on the foreign policy side, Germany would be well advised to strengthen the Commission rather than hollowing it out.